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The literature on the capabilities of weak states to withstand pressure from strong states suggests that 
more often than not, weaker states tend to give into the stronger power.  What are the motivating factors 
that enable weak states to withstand pressure from strong states? To ensure that the International 
Criminal Court does not gain jurisdiction over its nationals, the U.S. is currently seeking to sign BIAs 
with all countries under the rubric of the American Servicemembers' Protection Act.  This thesis examines 
through a comparative case study analysis how a number of African Countries are able to withstand the 
pressure to sign a U.S. Bilateral Immunity Agreement (BIA). The study reveals how states are able to 
withstand pressure regarding foreign policy issues, which go against their interests by taking advantage 
of internal and external institutional structures and mechanisms. It also fills a gap in the literature by 
examining one regions response to the BIAs relative to the U.S. position regarding the ICC.   
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CHAPTER 
 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
     How are weak states able to withstand pressure from strong states when foreign aid is at stake? I 
examine this issue through a comparative case study analysis as to how a number of African Countries are 
able and willing to sacrifice U.S. military and economic aid by not signing a U.S. Article 98 Bilateral 
Immunity Agreement (BIA). The literature on the capabilities of weak states to withstand pressure from 
strong states suggests that more often than not, the weaker state tends to give into the stronger power.  
Therefore, what are the factors within the African region that explain how some states are able to 
withstand pressure from the U.S., even at the cost of loss of aid?  
     To ensure that the International Criminal Court (ICC) does not gain jurisdiction over its nationals 
under any circumstance, the U.S. is currently seeking to sign BIAs with all countries under the rubric of 
the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA), which was signed into law on August 2, 2002 by 
President George W. Bush, codifying U.S. opposition to the ICC and restricting U.S. ability to cooperate 
with ICC investigations and trials.1  July 1, 2003 marked the deadline set out in the ASPA for the cut off 
of U.S. military assistance to ICC State Parties that had not signed the BIAs.2 Additionally, under the 
ASPA, the administration is obliged to cut off military aid to countries that have ratified the Rome Treaty 
to the ICC unless they are NATO allies or specially designated non-NATO allies.3  Bush is also 
empowered to waive sanctions on countries if it serves the national interest.4 As of July 2005, 100 
governments worldwide have reportedly signed the BIAs, while 45 have publicly refused for varying 
reasons. In Africa, out of 47 countries (North Africa excluded),5 32 countries have signed the BIAs while 
eight have refused: Benin, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Namibia, Niger, South Africa and Tanzania. The 
countries tallied are in Table 1. 6   
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TABLE 1                     
 
(Africa Region)         Status of U.S. Bilateral Immunity Agreements 
 
COUNTRY Non-ICC 
Party 
ICC 
STATE 
PARTY 
BIA 
STATUS 
by Country 
 
Refuse to 
Sign BIA 
Angola * s  Signed  
Benin  *  * 
Botswana  * Executive  
Burkina Faso  * Signed  
Burundi  * Signed  
Cameroon **s    
Cape Verde **s    
Central 
African 
Republic 
 * Signed  
Chad *s  Reciprocal  
Comoros *s  Signed  
Congo 
(Brazaville) 
 * Signed  
Congo (DRC) 
(Kinshasa) 
 * Executive  
Cote d’ Ivoire *s  Reciprocal  
Djibouti  * Signed  
Equatorial 
Guinea 
*  Signed  
Eritrea *s  Reciprocal  
Ethiopia *  Reciprocal  
Gabon  * Signed  
Gambia  * Ratified  
Ghana  * Ratified  
Guinea 
 
 * Signed  
Guinea-Bissau 
 
**s    
Kenya  *  * 
Lesotho  *  * 
Liberia  * Signed  
Madagascar *s  Signed  
Malawi  * Executive  
Mali  *  * 
Mauritania  
 
*  Ratified  
Mauritius  
 
 * Signed  
Mozambique *s  Ratified  
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Namibia  *  * 
Niger  *  * 
Nigeria  * Executive  
Rwanda *  Reciprocal  
Sao Tome  
& Principe  
 
**s    
Senegal  * Signed  
Seychelles *s  Reciprocal  
Sierra Leone  * Ratified  
Somalia *  No central gov’t  
South Africa  *  * 
Swaziland **    
Tanzania  *  * 
Togo *  Reciprocal  
Uganda  * Executive  
Zambia  * Signed  
Zimbabwe **s    
TOTALS (47) 20 27 32 8 
*s / country has signed but has not ratified the ICC Statute 
 
   
(BIA TERMS) 
 
STATE PARTY TO BIA (SP): Agreement of non-surrender to the ICC any U.S. national or U.S. 
military/government employee (past or present). 
RECIPROCAL: U.S. has agreed not to surrender nationals of this country to the ICC. 
RATIFIED AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT: BIA has entered into force. Based on public news 
reports; it is possible that other agreements have also entered into force, especially all countries that have 
received permanent waivers. 
EXEMPT: Exempted under the American Service members’ Protection Act (ASPA); military assistance 
cannot be suspended. 
WAIVED: President Bush has declared that the country will continue to receive aid, despite being an 
ICC member state. 
UNCONFIRMED: Not disclosed by the State Department/Country requested that the agreement not be 
revealed. 
 
 
Information updated 20 June 2005. Source: Coalition for the International Criminal Court.      
“Status of U.S. Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs).”  
   
  
** As of the publication date of this report, the aforementioned is not a State Party to the Rome Statute; 
therefore, they are not prohibited by § 2007 of the American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002 (22 
U.S.C. 7421 et seq.) from receiving military assistance: Cameroon, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Sao 
Tome and Principe and Swaziland. Somalia: Lack of a central Government   
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     This thesis will not debate the merits or non-merits of the ICC or the BIAs, albeit the implications 
within the domestic policy of certain African States do send a message that the ICCs purpose should not 
be hindered in any way through other legal instruments. The emphasis on the African region is important  
for two reasons: First, African proponents of the ICC argue that the BIAs undermine the legitimacy of the 
ICC thereby affecting the Court's potential. Currently there are four referrals to the ICC: the Central 
African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan and Uganda.7 Africa is 
therefore the litmus test as to the success of the ICC.8  Although the ICC is not the subject of this study, 
the BIA issue is of indirect significance in relation to the ICC, therefore, the response of the African 
States is of importance when examining the foreign policy behavior of the BIAs between two separate 
actors who see the ICC from two extreme viewpoints. Also, since the U.S. has withheld millions of 
dollars in military assistance from State Parties to the ICC that refuse to sign the BIAs, those countries 
that refuse to sign the BIAs are at risk of losing the aid that would assist them in combating the very 
crimes for which the ICC stands for. 
     Second, for almost a decade, the United States has sought to strengthen Africa's ability to tend to its 
own crises. According to a report from the World Policy Institute in June of 2005, although the millions 
of dollars being spent on U.S. military aid and sales to Africa pale in comparison to the billions being 
expended in the Middle East and South Asia, all of the major U.S. bilateral aid and sales programs have 
increased sharply in recent years. Funding to sub-Saharan Africa under the largest U.S. military aid 
program, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) doubled from $12 million in fiscal year 2000 to a proposed 
$24 million in the FY 2006 budget proposal and the number of recipient nations have grown from one to 
nine. The Pentagon’s International Military Education and Training (IMET) program has increased by 35 
percent from 2000 to the 2006 proposal, from $8.1 million to $11 million, and from 36 participating 
nations to 47. FMF more than quadrupled from 9.8 million in fiscal year 2000 to 40.3 million in fiscal 
year 2003 (the most recent year for which full statistics are available). Commercial Sales of arms licensed 
by the State Department grew from $.9 million to $3.8 million over the 2000 to 2003 period. These 
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bilateral programs are just the tip of the iceberg in terms of overall U.S. military aid commitments going 
forward. The U.S. European Command (EUROCOM) has requested $125 million over five years for the 
Pan-Sahel Initiative, which provides training and exercises with Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and other 
nations in the region. U.S. engagement under the program has gone far beyond traditional training to 
include involvement in combat operations.9 Therefore, the loss of aid would be detrimental to those 
struggling democracies in which the Bush Administration is concerned with when it comes to training 
personnel in order to protect their borders against would be terrorists.  
     Loss of funds would not only consist of aid for regular military training which the U.S. has given 
Africa throughout the years, but also through the Nethercutt Amendment, effective November 26, 2004.10  
The amendment, originally included in the House version of the foreign aid spending bill in July 2004 
prohibits assistance from the Economic Support Fund (ESF) for countries that refuse to sign a BIA. With 
a budget of over $2.5 billion, ESF promotes the foreign policy interests of the U.S. by assisting allies. The 
importance of this latest sanction is paramount as it would not only undermine the effectiveness of U.S. 
counter-terrorism efforts in Africa such as peace building, democratization and counter-drug initiatives 
but the frozen funds are intended to improve peacekeeping capacity, enhance border and maritime 
controls, thereby strengthening regional stability and decreasing reliance on U.S. peacekeeping 
capabilities.11 Withholding aid is paradoxical and detrimental in that it may further undermine the ability 
for some countries in Africa to tend to their own crises.        
     My theory is that the countries in this study will continue to refuse to sign a BIA despite pressure 
applied by the U.S. The hypotheses used to test my theory are: (1) The eight countries refuse to sign a 
BIA because of an alignment and / or obligation to regional organizations (2) The countries refuse to sign 
a BIA because they are under pressure from civil society and non-governmental organizations who 
oppose signing a BIA (3) Based upon domestic jurisprudence, the Countries refuse to sign a BIA because 
they believe it would violate their obligations as State parties to the Rome Treaty and the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties and (4) The countries refuse to sign a BIA because they believe the 
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request by the U.S. to sign a BIA violates State sovereignty. I will also discuss the aid factor and its 
influence concerning the 32 countries that have signed a BIA. 
     Lastly, this thesis contributes to the growing literature of how domestic, regional and external 
variables influence a weak states behavior toward a more dominant power.  Theories are used as 
analytical tools for identifying the relevant explanatory factors in relation to the research question. This 
study also fills a gap in the literature by examining one regions response to the BIAs relative to the U.S. 
stance concerning the ICC. 
 
2.   BACKGROUND 
     In April 2002, the ICC came into force with over sixty ratifications. The ICC is a permanent tribunal in 
which the crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity will be addressed. In May of 
2002, the U.S. declared that it no longer intended to pursue ratification of the Rome Statute and asked to 
remove its signature from the Statute.12  Threatening to withdraw American peacekeepers from Bosnia, 
the U.S. pushed through Resolution No. 1422 in the UN Security Council in July 2002, exempting all UN 
peacekeepers from the ICCs jurisdiction for one year; it was renewed in June 2003.13  The U.S. then 
launched a campaign to ensure that its nationals would not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
     The U.S. concern lies within a situation where a U.S. national could be accused of a crime in the 
territory of a State that is a party to the ICC. Under the “principle of complementarity,” the State where 
the crime occurred is obligated to surrender the U.S. national to the ICC, if the State is unable or 
unwilling to prosecute the matter.14 Of utmost importance to the U.S., this obligation applies even when 
the accused is a national of a State that is not a party to the ICC.15  In this respect, the U.S. has argued that 
the ICC gives too much discretion to prosecutors who may bring politically motivated charges against 
U.S. citizens, officials and / or military personnel.16  The BIAs sought by the U.S. would require states to 
send an American national requested by the ICC back to the U.S. instead of surrendering him/her to the 
ICC.  
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     According to Erik Rosenfeld, “the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 dramatically changed U.S. 
military strategy” (Rosenfeld 2003:288).  He explains:  
“While foreign countries have recently allowed the U.S. to station troops on their soil as part of the war 
on terrorism, it remains to be seen whether they will provide immunity against ICC jurisdiction in the 
form of Status of Forces Agreements” (SOFAs).17   
 
Thus, Rosenfeld reasons: “the war on terrorism has exposed a need for access to foreign bases, thereby 
shifting some negotiating advantage in favor of the receiving country and away from the U.S.”(Rosenfeld 
2003: 288).  He continues:  
“In several cases, the U.S. has obtained exclusive jurisdiction over military personnel from countries 
where it has been involved in humanitarian relief efforts or similar military interventions. These 
agreements have usually been negotiated with countries in dire need of U.S. assistance that are willing to 
sacrifice legal jurisdiction in order to obtain economic or military aid.  Negotiated on a case-by-case 
basis, these agreements responded to the necessity for immediate U.S. military involvement” (Rosenfeld 
2003: 291).   
 
     However, with the recent history of wartime abuses; the alleged torture at Guantanamo Bay, the torture 
incidents at Abu Ghraib and the assault on Fallujah in 2004, the debate over the BIAs have become more 
prominent, which serves to reemphasize the importance of the BIAs to the U.S. and ultimately, the scope 
of the BIAs to governments around the world. 
     
3.   LITERATURE REVIEW   
      How are weak states able to withstand pressure from strong states? First, pressure needs defining, as 
do weak versus strong states. Pressure in the context of this study pertains to influence. Particularly, the 
ability to influence a state into signing a BIA through the inducement of aid.  The inducement of aid is 
similar to the bargaining process whereby the stronger state bargains with the weaker state in order to 
produce results compliant with their interests. Baldwin describes the bargaining process as “non-aid” in 
which the stronger nation would get the weaker nation to do something they would not otherwise do, by 
rigging the incentives so that the weaker nation must choose in the stronger nations favor (Baldwin 1969: 
430).  Marshall R. Singer emphasizes how “weaker states are more likely to choose bilateral aid donors 
over multilateral aid donors because they often believe they can get more by direct negotiation with the 
    
 
8
   
   
 
bilateral donor rather than a multilateral agency” (Singer 1972: 253). This would also give a weaker state 
more leverage over certain foreign policy issues in that they may bargain according to their political 
interests if necessary.  
     According to Bruce E. Moon, there are two conceptions that probe the influence relationship: (1) the 
bargaining model whereby threats and promises condition the weaker state to alter its foreign policy 
behavior towards the preferences of the dominant state or (2) that of a relationship in which influence 
occurs before the actual decision-making process and foreign policies are formed in relation to the interest 
and perspectives which they derive in part from a dependency relationship (Moon 1983: 317-318).  
McKinlay and Little explain the dependency relationship: 
“A dependency relationship exists when one party relies on another without the reliance being 
reciprocated. While one party can terminate the relationship with little or no cost, the other can do so only 
at considerable cost. The reliant party, therefore, operates in a subordinate or dependent position. A 
dominant state establishes dependency relationships because they generate a degree of control or 
influence. The main utility of dependency is the potential for control. This control can be used for a 
variety of ends dictated by the dominate state” (McKinlay and Little 1977: 62).   
 
     Singer reasons: “A weak country can be highly dependent upon a specific power economically while 
simultaneously being quite counter dependent politically, or, conversely, two countries can be politically 
and perceptually interdependent, yet one may be economically dependent upon the other (Singer 1972: 
48).        
     The term weak state in this research is used synonymously with weak power or small state while 
strong state is used synonymously with great power, strong power or large state.  There is a range of 
literature, which defines the weak versus strong state (See Rakipi 2004, Wise 2004, Rotberg 2003, 
Mitchell and Keilbach 2001, Anda 2000, Herbst 2000, Jackson and Rosberg 1982, Migdal 1987, Handel 
1981, Singer 1972) but scholars differ on precise terms. However, various definitions do share some 
common characteristics such as legitimacy, sustainability, human security, the rule of law, political 
freedoms, an active civil society, etc.  Mitchell and Keilbach define the weak versus strong state:  
“Strong states consist of those that possess resources (such as military might or a strong trade relationship 
in a crucial good) that can be used to impose costs on others for undesirable behavior. Although weak 
states lack resources to coerce or compel by imposing costs, they may be able to persuade or induce 
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behavioral changes by using other resources…A state’s power is thus relational and issue-specific; 
dependent on how committed it is to achieving its own goals and on how vulnerable and sensitive other 
countries are to the resources it controls” (Mitchell and Keilbach, 2001: 896). 
 
     Similarly, Michael O. Anda’s definition is one of power:  
  
“A state has interests, and the power to influence actors in pursuit of those interests, in other regions of 
the world as well as its own…nations which influence domestic politics and foreign policies of other 
countries in several areas of the world and which are individually superior to other nations materially, 
militarily, and in motivation” (Anda 2000: 32).  
 
     Taking the aforementioned into consideration, dependency would predict that the stronger state would 
be able to influence the weaker state into actions compliant with their interests. Therefore, if dependency 
suggests that weaker states tend to rely on the more powerful states, then what factors might account for 
why the eight countries in this study have been able to withstand U.S. pressure over the BIAs?  It is 
obvious that the dependency paradigm does not adequately explain this paradox. Moreover, the reason 
why weaker states comply with stronger states is debatable in the literature. There seems to be no uniform 
pattern or theory that explains why weak states behave as they do.    
     According to Anda:  
“In the study of international relations, a state’s resources are frequently assumed to define its capacity for 
action, and power is often assumed to be exercised in affecting foreign policy behavioral output…some 
states matter more than others, that large states matter more than small states because their size provides 
them with more resources and greater power” (Anda 2000: 241).  
 
However, according to Hans Mouritzen, “the size factor has been shown to possess only a modest or 
negligible causal power of its own” (Mouritzen 1991: 217).  Handel agrees with this analysis in that “one 
cannot correlate positively the size (or strength) of a state with the shape or form of its decision-making 
process” (Handel 1981: 263). Robert O. Keohane has suggested defining states on “the basis of the scope 
of their influence on the international system.  He refers to the great powers as ‘system-determining’ 
states: “A great power is a state whose leaders consider that it can alone exercise a large, perhaps decisive 
impact on the international system”…the weaker the state, the less its influence on the international 
system” (Keohane 1969: 295-296).  Similarly, Singer emphasizes, “The crucial difference lies in the 
ability of the most powerful countries to determine…which commitments they will honor and which they 
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will not.  The less powerful countries of the world have far less choice in such matters” (Singer 1972: 38). 
Handel undermines the aforementioned analyses to some degree by emphasizing how weak states may 
exert influence:  
“Weak states are by no means impotent, helpless victims of the system. On the contrary, they are quick to 
take advantage of the opportunities arising from the nature of any given international system. They learn 
to manipulate the competition between the great powers to their own ends, and in this way they exert a 
considerable amount of influence, even if not a critical one, on the system itself…It often happens that the 
weak states manipulate a great power in the direction of their interests, more than the other way around” 
(Handel 1981: 45-46, 130).  
 
     There are also, according to Singer, “certain individuals or groups in society that are able to influence 
the behavior of others because they have what is believed to be prestige or status…this also applies to 
states” (Singer 1972:74-75).  Lana Wylie, in her research on BIAs in the Carribbean Region18 suggests 
that “states make choices because they are seeking more abstract goals…prestige being one” (Wylie 
2004: 2). She further emphasizes how “prestige is used to increase the visibility of the smaller state thus 
giving them some measure of influence which translates into more international respect and wider 
influence in international relations” (Wylie 2004: 20).  
      Which leads to the question: what options do weak states have in order to overcome the pressure from  
strong states? A great deal of literature discusses the strategy that weak states may employ. One strategy 
is for the weak state to turn inward in order to ward off increasing pressure from a stronger state.  
According to Handel, “weak states must learn to draw on or borrow strength from other states” (Handel 
1981: 120). There are two major ways in which the weak states can recruit the support of other countries: 
(1) They may enter into a formal alliance with other states or (2) they may reach an informal, though not 
necessarily less helpful, understanding with partners sharing common interests.19  According to Anda:  
 “There are over fifty states in Africa…most of which are poor and weak: it is therefore unsurprising that 
much of the continent’s diplomacy should be conducted through organizations, or that states should seek 
through myriad cooperation and integration schemes to compensate for their weaknesses as separate 
units” (Anda 2000: 12). 
 
    Institutionalism is theoretically relevant to how weak states may counter pressure from stronger states.  
An informal institutional alliance may include regional organizations, civil society and NGO’s where 
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members share common interests or causes. Allison and Zelikow argue that “domestic preferences are 
explained through regional and international organizations which play a large role in state decision-
making and a major factor in explaining cooperation among states” (Allison and Zelikow, 1999:33) while 
North reasons: “the role of decision structures, allocations of power, authority, formal and informal rules 
play a role in decision-making and foreign policy outcomes” (North 1990:3). The political or legal 
obligations from such organizations, especially if they “represent some segment of domestic society, 
whose interests are reflected in state policy”20 may override the concerns of threat from the stronger 
power, which enable the weaker state to ignore the threat.  
     Khadiagala and Lyons reason: “in order to overcome their inherent weaknesses, African states 
construct their own continental and regional institutions… they band together into blocs that enhance their 
leverage in world affairs….thereby solving problems collectively” (Khadiagala and Lyons 2001: 4).  
“Southern Africa’s greatest strength has been the legacy of institution building, which lends meaning to 
the foreign policy actions of otherwise poor and weak states. Civil Society is also important in order to 
gain support as more groups with diverse interests are able to forge common positions along salient issues 
such as human rights, etc. This demonstrates the potential for collaborative coalescence… and bolsters 
collective latitude.  In this respect, NGOs and civil society foster strategic links with networks to subvert 
the policy roles of formal state actors” (Khadiagala and Lyons 2001: 214-215). 
 
     Although institutions are useful in providing a common stance and a collective voice on issues of 
importance, they do have their drawbacks. Singer explains:  
“No state in any of these organizations is formally bound to follow the international political lead of the 
mentor Power…but there is a high degree of similarity of international political behavior among members 
in following the international self-interest of the mentor power, either because there is a high degree of 
similarity among the members as to the definition of political self-interest in international matters, or 
because the weaker states feel obliged to go along with the definition of international self-interest 
supplied by the mentor power” (Singer 1972: 338).   
    
     A formal alliance may include allying with other states internally or externally. Handel explains: 
 
“The attempt of a weak state to augment its own internal strength with the external strength of another 
state, usually a more powerful one-is a result of necessity, not preference. Whatever the inherent dangers 
of treaties between unequal partners, a weak state under the threat of a great power will choose the lesser 
of two evils: an alliance with another great power in order to reduce the pressures upon it…The major 
question for many if not most weak states is not whether they should enter into an alliance with a stronger 
power. It is rather, how to obtain the external aid of another powerful state, how to commit the other 
power to support their interests…for many weak states, this is the normal way of life rather than the 
exception” (Handel 1981: 121-122).  
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     Similarly, in order for a weak state to gain leverage over a more powerful state, Mouritzen suggests 
that “weak states are able to overcome the power differential when they employ a ‘non-commitment’ 
strategy in which a weak state plays off two strong powers against each other” (Mouritzen 1991: 220). 
Hawkins et al., conclude that “although they do not have much influence, less powerful states can impose 
costs on powerful states through non-cooperation” (Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney, 2004:34-35).  
Non-commitment and non-cooperation are similar in that they allow the weaker state to bargain or gain 
leverage over the more powerful state in order to influence foreign policy outcomes. Theoretically, 
playing two powers against each other is indicative of game theory (2-player game) within the rational 
actor paradigm which holds that alliances form whenever two or more actors determine they will receive 
more benefits in coalition than each would do by going it alone. According to Allison and Zelikow, under 
this theory, governments are treated as the primary actor. In the rational actor model of decision making, 
decision makers seek to accomplish certain tasks: “accurately identify the problem that confronts them 
(the government examines a set of goals) take into account the key factors that bear on the problem 
(critically examine alternative courses of action and evaluate them according to their utility) and make a 
choice that will wisely maximize benefits and minimize costs “(picks a goal with the highest payoff) 
(Allison and Zelikow 1999: 23-25).   
     One theme running throughout this literature is that of the disparity between weak and strong states 
and the ability of the weak state to project its influence into foreign relations. Scholars differ on whether 
the size of a state reflects its foreign-policy decision-making, but what they do agree on is the number of 
ways in which weak states may exert their influence or counter pressure either alone or with other weak 
states. The strategy of using informal and formal sources such as regional organizations, NGOs and civil 
society may be one way; another way is to ally with international organizations or external powers that 
share their interests.   
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4.  DISCUSSION: THE AID FACTOR 
     The use of aid to induce states into signing a BIA creates significant economic incentives for states 
worldwide to sign. This is the main factor that has caused the majority of states in the African region to 
comply.21  Are states more inclined to sign a BIA because they are dependant upon aid? Although aid is 
not a hypothesis in this study, I deemed it important enough to discuss, as the majority of countries in 
Africa that have signed BIAs have made their decisions based upon the aid factor.22 Therefore, 
highlighting the issue will put forth one perspective as to why a majority of African countries have signed 
BIAs, which in turn will give some idea as to why the eight countries in this study do not sign a BIA. 
     In A Foreign Policy Model of U.S. Bilateral Aid Allocation, McKinlay and Little discuss two views of 
aid allocation: the humanitarian view considers that economic assistance is the primary rationale for aid, 
whereas the foreign policy view sees economic assistance as the means whereby a donor’s interests can 
be satisfied (McKinlay and Little 1977:61). Accordingly, this study will analyze aid from the foreign 
policy view in that ASPA and ESF aid is used as an incentive in order to further the interests of the U.S.  
     The operationalization of aid consists of comparing bilateral aid receipts as a percentage of country 
GDP. According to McKinlay and Little, “this provides a measure of the importance of a donor’s aid to 
the economy of the recipient and in turn, the degree of control the donor has over the recipient, which 
increases with the size of aid received” (1977:66). McKinlay and Little explain the operationalization of 
relative need versus commitment: 
“The best single indicator of relative need is population and per capita GDP. As population increases and 
per capita GDP declines, the relative need for aid rises. Thus, GDP is the single best indicator of a 
country’s assets. On the other hand, absolute commitment means that if two countries are offered the 
same amount of aid, but one countries population is higher and GDP per capita is lower, then preference 
is being shown to the wealthier countries in that its relative need is lower.  The preference or deviation 
from the dictates of relative need constitutes relative commitment. Commitment identifies an attempt by 
one state to register its support for another” (McKinlay and Little 1977, 66). 
   
     Relative commitment is operationalized by the index: Gross Aid X Per Capita GDP / Population.  I 
chose this model of bilateral aid allocation because it provides a unique model by which a countries 
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relative need for aid may be analyzed but when combined with country studies shows the U.S. 
commitment and preference to certain countries in Africa based upon foreign policy interests.  
      The majority of country data for the status of BIAs were obtained through the CICC’s website, which 
keeps an ongoing statistical table on the status of BIAs and aid withheld under the ASPA. The CICC also 
has an individual country section, which lists all of the legal and political issues from each region of 
Africa in relation to the ICC and BIAs. The Political-Military Affairs Bureau of the U.S. State 
Department Website (USDOS) has a page specifically dedicated to Article 98 Agreements. The only 
drawback to this website is that it is not regularly updated, so I relied mainly on the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DOD) for which I obtained very reliable data on the types of military programs in each country 
and aid provided under the ASPA.  Instead of showing 2003 actual and 2004 estimates, I used 2005 
requests as these figures are more indicative of current trends in each country. The statistical data 
obtained for military aid and its purposes are very reliable, as are the country studies and their relation to 
the U.S. in terms of aid provided.  USDOS and the 2005 CIA Factbook were used for GDP and country 
information as data was more current.  
 
ALTERNATE AID      
     When examining aid, it is useful to look at the prospect of alternate aid, which may be used to offset 
aid that is withheld, thus eliminating the pressure factor. Consistent with game theory in the rational actor 
paradigm, coalition building with other spheres of influence is one strategy which can help disempowered 
States develop their power base and thereby better defend their interests. Moreover, states may 
bandwagon23 in an attempt to show force against a stronger power. In this respect, if weak African 
countries are confronted with pressure that they do not have the power to resist, they can increase their 
power by combining their resources and advancing their common interests by forming with other nations 
with similar values and goals. The offer of aid from alternate sources is similar to the two-player game in 
Game Theory.  The weaker states use another powerful source by which to counter-balance against the 
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original threat.  The EU and Africa with their similar stance on the ICC and the BIAs are indicative of this 
trend.      
     I relied upon communiqués from Europe and Canada via statements regarding the offsetting of aid in 
order to influence African governments from signing a BIA. I also relied on country responses via news 
sources that have stressed the importance of turning to other countries for aid such as the EU, Japan, 
China, etc. Spheres of external influence are dominant in the aid issue regarding the opposition of the 
U.S. to the ICC via the BIAs and the opposition to the BIAs from the EU and Canada through their 
support to African Countries. Analyzing the prospect of aid offered by the EU, (very involved in Africa) 
and by Canada under the African Caribbean/European Union initiative (ACP-EU) offers another 
alternative which may explain why some countries do not sign a BIA. The data I have thus far for the 
eight countries are very reliable. Communiqués were obtained from the CICC website and reliable news 
sources. I also interviewed the Legal Advisor for Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), David Donat 
Cattin to get his input on alternate aid per the ACP-EU communique. I have also drawn upon personal 
interviews from African experts on the BIA issue regarding the need for certain countries to look for 
alternate aid from other regions of the world to offset the aid lost from the U.S.  
 
5.   HYPOTHESES AND DATA 
Regional Organizations 
     One factor that may influence a country’s decision-making is pressure within and among regional 
organizations. Pressure in this sense refers to the influence that regional organizations have upon 
countries when it comes to foreign policy interests. Regional organizations often work in tandem when 
supporting foreign policy issues, thereby forming a coalition on deterring neighbor states from doing what 
is against their interests. This is often accomplished by regional organizations creating mandates for their 
members to follow or making membership contingent upon states following certain requirements of the 
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organization. In Africa, there is widespread recognition of the benefits to be derived from regional 
collaboration.24 As Wedgewood and Peck explain: 
“Regional organizations are superior in being more familiar with local conditions, culture, and actors. 
They benefit from lower costs and faster response and are more adept at manipulating local organizations. 
These organizations have expanded their capacity to take on certain objectives other than that for which 
they were originally designed” (Wedgewood and Peck 2001: 578).  
 
Peck also emphasizes:  
 
“Organizations such as the OAU (now the AU-African Union), ECOWAS and the SADC which 
originally formed for economic reasons are now taking on a peace and security role, because of the 
realization that the two issues are closely linked” (Peck, 2001: 563).  
 
Thus, acting as a solid front, regional organizations often unite on common goals when it comes to 
foreign policy. The human rights issues that have affected African countries past and present, the 
obligations that arise from being a party to the ICC and the subsequent act of regional organizations 
taking on expanding roles may be a factor in a countries refusal to sign a BIA. Stein (1983: 116) suggests 
that, “Regimes arise because actors forgo independent decision making in order to deal with the dilemmas 
of common interests and common aversion. They do so in their own self-interest.”  Hence,  
Hypothesis 1:  The eight countries refuse to sign a BIA because of an alignment and / or obligation to   
Regional Organizations.  
  
     This variable examines the regional organizations of the East African Community (EAC), the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the South African Development 
Community (SADC) in order to see if there is a correlation between any of the states being a member of 
the organization (s) and / or being a party to the ICC.  Specifically, do these organizations have specific 
mandates that would reinforce their legal obligation to the ICC thus influencing countries decision to sign 
a BIA?  Have they organized meetings relevant to the issues of the BIAs thereby forming a coalition on 
deterring members from signing them? Lastly, what accounts for the fact that some members of these 
organizations have signed BIAs, while others have not? Statements from personal interviews, 
communiqués, mandates and reliable news sources are used to determine whether regional organizations 
within Africa have exerted an influence on a countries’ decision to sign a BIA. 
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Civil Society and Non-Governmental Organizations 
     According to Iris Almeida: 
“NGOs have learnt that…. educating and mobilizing public opinion provides leverage to influence policy 
decisions of States. The strategy used domestically is to target key actors in the Government and members 
of Parliament. Internationally, it is to use every opportunity available to work within the framework of the 
UN and to place the establishment of the ICC on the political agenda of world leaders” (Almeida: 63).   
 
     Civil-society and NGOs have had an impact on their respective governments concerning the ICC and 
BIAs. For example, NGOs in Africa have offered workshops and/or mandates in support of the ICC of 
which eight of the countries are members. The workshops have been instrumental in training officials on 
the issues and workings of the mechanisms of the ICC and BIAs. The workshops have also encouraged 
and involved civil society participation in engaging with governments to ratify and implement legal 
instruments important to the promotion and protection of human right. Hence,  
Hypothesis 2:  The countries refuse to sign a BIA because they are under pressure from civil society and 
non-governmental organizations that oppose signing a BIA.  
 
     Civil Society and NGOs consists of a group of persons and / or a network of organizations that 
represent other persons and organizations in their communities concerning cultural, ideological or 
political issues.  Pressure within civil society and NGOs represent the influence that these groups have on 
their respective governments concerning the BIA issue.  This hypothesis will be tested by examining the 
influence of civil society and NGOs concerning the BIA issue. Specifically, what steps have they taken 
and how significant has their influence been concerning the BIAs? 
 
The Legal Factor 
      While theories vary, there is a general understanding among international lawyers that states act in 
two realms: the external, where they are members of the community of nations, and the internal, where 
they exercise sovereign authority over matters within their respective territories. One consequence of this 
division is that international law generally leaves each state to give its own domestic effect to treaty 
obligations. In this connection, some states follow a "monist" approach to international law. That is, 
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international law and domestic law form a single body of jurisprudence governing internal affairs. Once 
ratified, treaties are regarded as self-executing or directly applicable, and they automatically have the 
force of law. Others adopt a "dualist" view. They see international law as quite separate and distinct from 
domestic law, requiring an act of domestic legislation in addition to ratification before international norms 
become binding nationally. The legislation becomes the sole legal authority in the state. In this regard, 
African states vary widely in how they effectuate treaty commitments at home. So what happens when a 
court must choose between a treaty provision and a national law? One possible resolution is a 
constitutional provision giving treaties superior status over domestic law.25 Many African constitutions 
incorporate such a provision, including those of Benin, Mali and Niger. 
     Certain governments in Africa have declared openly that they believe signing a BIA would violate 
their obligations as State Parties under the Rome Statute. This is especially true concerning South Africa, 
a dominant power in the region who has been very vocal in espousing its reluctance on signing a BIA 
which it believes would undermine the ICC. Another example is Benin who sent the BIA to their 
Supreme Court for a legal analysis in order to get feedback on whether the BIA was consistent with 
domestic legislation per their obligation under the Rome Statute.   
     There are a few more factors that may be less significant under the realm of legal obligation that may 
contribute to whether a country signs a BIA. It should be mentioned here that these are my personal 
opinions and are not quotes from government official’s scholars or journalists. Legal principle involving 
states obligations under the Rome Statute also includes the issue of ICC Judges elected from Ghana, Mali, 
and South Africa to sit on the ICC Bench. It serves to reason that any country that is a State Party to the 
ICC and has a Judge on the ICC bench would not want to do anything to undermine the functions of the 
Court. In this respect, I will analyze why Ghana chose to sign a BIA in spite of the fact that it has a sitting 
Judge in the ICC versus why Mali and South Africa refuse to sign a BIA. The third factor that might 
influence the legal principle is the ICTR, which is seated in Tanzania. Tanzania’s relationship as the home 
of the ICTR falls under useful determinants in signing a BIA. I will admit to using a more common-sense 
    
 
19
   
   
 
approach regarding this issue because of the human rights issues that arise from being the host of the 
ICTR and because of the Tanzanian Embassy Bombing (terrorism). In this respect, Tanzania has more 
than enough reason to refuse a BIA on the grounds of its history.  It is also useful to explore why Rwanda 
signed a BIA and Tanzania has not relative to the ICTR. Hence,  
Hypothesis 3:  Based upon domestic jurisprudence, the Countries refuse to sign a BIA because they          
believe it will violate their obligations as State parties to the Rome Treaty and the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties.  
 
      Common domestic jurisprudence as it applies to the legal factor means the interpretation of foreign 
law to domestic law. This hypothesis will be tested using comments from country officials, legal opinions 
from domestic courts and interviews with African Journalists, law scholars and ICC experts. The data I 
obtained for the case of Ghana and Rwanda are quite valid via African news sources, scholarly writings 
and communiqués.  
 
The Sovereignty Factor  
     One of the oldest factors concerning a states decision to honor certain legal instruments is whether the 
state believes the instrument or the request in itself violates a nation’s sovereignty. A common refrain 
popularly espoused about treaties is that they surrender national sovereignty, and therefore represent a 
threat to a countries’ interest. Accordingly, the right to enter into a treaty and be legally bound by it is a 
vital aspect of any nation's sovereignty. Christopher Kilby discusses the issue of political sovereignty 
within the realm of aid. Although his essay is structured around official international aid, I have applied it 
to the bilateral aid relationship. Stressing the importance of the territorial domain and domestic policies of 
a sovereign state, he explains:  
“Any action which directly or intentionally threatens the integrity of the state or the welfare of its citizens 
is prohibited. The duties of the aid donor appear to require aid conditionality that directly conflicts with 
respect for recipient state sovereignty in that it conflicts with the duty of the state to improve the welfare 
of its citizens, while at the same time preserving state sovereignty… “When governments consider the 
needs of their citizens instead of their wants, then they are not free to reject aid” (Kilby 1999:11-13).    
 
Alternately, Jeffrey Herbst in his influential study of States and Power in Africa concludes that:  
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“African nations are still extremely insecure about their sovereignty because they do not exercise 
authority across their territories. Indeed, African nations jealously guard their sovereignty because it is so 
critical to the exercise of power and have constantly refused to implement arrangements like the European 
Union’s that diminish the authority of States” (Herbst, 2000: 234). 
    
     Hence,  
Hypothesis 4: The countries refuse to sign a BIA because they believe the request by the U.S.    
to sign a BIA violates State sovereignty. 
 
     In examining this hypothesis, I will proffer statements from country officials, scholars and journalists 
who have stressed the importance of national sovereignty as a major issue in their countries refusal to sign 
a BIA. 
     In summary, the following hypotheses will be tested in this study: 
Hypothesis 1: The eight countries refuse to sign a BIA because of an alignment and / or obligation to 
Regional organizations.  
Hypothesis 2: The countries refuse to sign a BIA because they are under pressure from civil  
society and non-governmental organizations that oppose signing a BIA.  
Hypothesis 3: Based upon domestic jurisprudence, the Countries refuse to sign a BIA because they 
believe it would violate their obligations as State parties to the Rome Treaty and the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties.  
Hypothesis 4:  The countries refuse to sign a BIA because they believe the request by the U.S.    
to sign a BIA violates State sovereignty. 
 
6.   DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION: 
      COUNTRY STUDIES:  U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS / AFRICA 
     The following country information regarding military programs is listed in the database on U.S. 
Military Assistance for the Congressional Budget Justification for FY05 Foreign Operations, April 2005. 
African Region-ASPA AID.26  The following sections explain the U.S. interest in each country and the 
type of aid at stake under the ASPA.  See Appendix B and C for an explanation of types of aid under 
ASPA and the breakdown for civilians trained under these programs in 2004 and 2005.  Appendix C also 
shows U.S. statements regarding the prohibition of aid to seven countries (Kenya info outdated). 
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BENIN / MALI / NIGER   
     The primary U.S. interests in Benin militarily are working cooperatively on regional security concerns.  
The strategy for addressing these interests is to reinforce Benin’s support of regional stability and 
peacekeeping through diplomacy and military-to-military contacts. FMF is beneficial in providing Benin 
with the tools necessary to play its role in regional peacekeeping operations.  Benin hosted an ACOTA 
(African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance) program in mid-200427 and was eligible in FY 
2005 to receive Excess Defense Articles (EDA) on a grant basis under Section 516 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act (FAA). Equipment received under this program such as several types of military 
equipment and hospital supplies would support Benin’s peacekeeping and counterterrorism efforts.28   
     The primary U.S. military interests in Mali are democracy and helping the national government 
address humanitarian goals. Other interests include the PSI Initiative which supports efforts to establish 
lasting regional stability and enhances Mali’s ability to prevent terrorists from using its territory for 
basing and trafficking. In FY 2005, the IMET program would reinforce the progress already made by the 
Malian Armed Forces towards becoming a more professional organization through training and seminars. 
It will also provide opportunities for the professional officer corps to attend courses that stress greater 
respect for and understanding of the requirement to support human rights and civilian control of the 
military. Over the past decade, Malian Armed Forces have evolved from an instrument of government 
control to a professional organization and many IMET graduates hold high positions in their ministries 
and the armed services.  Mali was eligible in FY 2005 to receive EDA on a grant basis under Section 516 
of the FAA while provisions of grant EDA would support Mali’s ability to control its borders and 
undertake peacekeeping operations.29  
     U.S. Military interests in Niger include democracy, human rights, regional security and countering 
terrorism. Niger is a poor country, and is ringed by unstable neighbors, making its territory difficult to 
police.  Its impoverished people are a ready target for anti-Western radical extremists. The Government of 
Niger considers extremism a threat and supports the coalition against terror. The failed, but very serious, 
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military uprisings of August 2002 underscore the critical nature of working intensively with Niger to 
encourage democracy to take firm root. Niger recognizes that its military can play a vital role in both 
security and development, and values the assistance it receives through the IMET program in helping to 
train its forces for peacekeeping and civic action duties, as well as for traditional security roles.  IMET 
courses help increase the military’s capacity and reinforce the military's role as a professional institution. 
The FY 2005 program would build on earlier IMET efforts by providing additional courses on civil-
military relations, military justice, peacekeeping and English language training. These courses would also 
address special issues, such as technical training for Air Force personnel, training for the military police, 
and training for engineers for civic action.  Initiated with FY 2002 peacekeeping operations (PKO) funds, 
Niger is a participant with Mali, Chad and Mauritania in PSI. The PSI program helps the four countries 
gain greater control over movement of potential terrorist groups, thus supporting the U.S. national 
security interests of waging war on terrorism and enhancing regional peace and security. Niger was 
eligible in FY 2005 to receive EDA on a grant basis under Section 516 of the FAA. Grant EDA would 
primarily be used to help Niger better control its borders and participate in peacekeeping activities.30   
 
KENYA / TANZANIA 
     Kenya is the linchpin of East African stability and security. Its support for the war on terrorism has 
been solid and wholehearted, a recognition that Kenya has twice been a target of Al Qaeda bombs. It 
remains a principal point of access for U.S. military and relief operations within the region. Kenya is 
among the United Nations’ top troop-contributing nations, taking on difficult assignments such as Sierra 
Leone and Ethiopia-Eritrea. The strategy for addressing these interests is to enhance Kenya's capability 
and confidence to participate in peacekeeping operations, improve its national security, governance, 
human rights situation and trafficking in persons.  In FY 2005, IMET courses would fund Command and 
Staff College participation, civil-military relations, English language training, and technical specialty 
training.  Sustained IMET funding and continued access to FMF funds would also enhance Kenya's 
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ability to protect its borders and coastal areas from terrorists and insurgents plus increase the 
professionalism of the Kenyan military while providing specialized border and coastal security training.  
Kenya was eligible in FY 2005 to EDA on a grant basis under Section 516 of the FAA.  Equipment 
received under this program such as several types of military equipment and hospital supplies would 
support Kenya’s peacekeeping and counterterrorism efforts.31 
     Regional stability, counter-terrorism, the promotion of democracy and human rights, humanitarian 
response (particularly to refugee issues), and law enforcement are the U.S. principal military interests in 
Tanzania. Tanzania’s strategic location makes it a vital partner in assuring the stability of East Africa. 
Having suffered an Al-Qaeda terrorist attack (the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam), 
Tanzania is a strong supporter of the war on terrorism. Tanzania has historically enjoyed internal political 
stability and continues to support peace and stability in the region, particularly as regards conflict in and 
between the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. In the past, IMET programs have helped to 
professionalize the Tanzanian Peoples’ Defense Force (TPDF) and train it to better control the country’s 
borders as well as manage refugee flows from conflict areas like Burundi. Tanzania’s program focuses on 
training for all strata of the TPDF from senior-level, Ministry of Defense officials down to non-
commissioned officers. The courses strengthen the TPDFs capacity to conduct peacekeeping and 
humanitarian operations. Funds would also be used to deepen the TPDFs understanding of the impact of 
HIV/AIDS upon the military.  Prohibited by ASPA, Tanzania was eligible in FY 2005 to receive EDA on 
a grant basis under Section 516 of the FAA. Grant EDA, such as vehicles, radios, individual clothing and 
equipment, help support Tanzanian peacekeeping efforts in the region. As home to more than a million 
refugees over the last decade, Tanzania has benefited from IMET and EDA funds and used them 
effectively in the past.32  
LESOTHO / NAMIBIA / SOUTH AFRICA 
     The primary U.S. military interests in Lesotho and Namibia are democracy and helping the national 
government address humanitarian goals. Assisting Lesotho in strengthening its democratic foundations 
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will serve to enhance regional security and lay the groundwork for continued national and regional 
economic stability. In FY 2005, the IMET program would reinforce the progress already made by 
Lesotho. Namibia was eligible in FY 2005 to receive EDA on a grant basis under Section 516 of the 
FAA. Provisions of grant EDA would support Namibia’s ability to control its borders, undertake 
peacekeeping operations and will be used to support the Namibian Defense Forces efforts to undertake 
peacekeeping operations and respond to regional humanitarian crises.33  
     The U.S. has major military interests in South Africa's continuing development as a stable, democratic 
state, and one that is capable of addressing its major internal challenges. Although South Africa opposes 
some U.S. policies in international fora, it is a cooperative partner in tangibly addressing terrorist and 
international crime threats, nonproliferation, regional instability and the security of Americans visiting 
South Africa.  A joint DOD-National Institute of Health (NIH) program will be launched in FY 2005 to 
help the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) deal with the HIV/AIDS challenge to the armed 
forces.  The U.S. also has a clear interest in helping South Africa address a serious problem with local and 
international organized crime, as well as the related threat of terrorist activity. Islamic extremism is a 
growing threat. The national police force, the South African Police Service (SAPS), is an organization 
still in transition; its legacy as an instrument of the apartheid regime still evokes public hostility, and 
funding cuts have eroded morale and its ability to fight ever-stronger criminal elements. Modest funding 
for IMET activities was requested for FY 2005. South Africa was eligible in FY 2005 to receive EDA on 
a grant basis under Section 516 of the FAA. Provision of grant EDA would support South Africa's 
peacekeeping activities and enhance cooperative relationships. EDA C-130s from FY 1996, as well as FY 
2002 and 2003 FMF and PKO funds were used to support South Africa’s mission in Burundi.34   
     The $5 million Safe Skies for Africa Program is also threatened by loss of aid. The program is meant 
to improve aviation safety and security in selected African programs. It also fosters economic growth, 
combats terrorism, narcotics trafficking and weapons smuggling, while also keeping airline passengers 
safe.  Countries in this program include Namibia, Mali, Tanzania and Benin. 35 
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DATA ANALYSIS: The Aid Factor   
     Tables 2 and 3 show the 2005 gross aid requests for military funding under the ASPA for the eight 
countries in this study and for the 32 that have signed BIAs.  ESF is combined into Gross Aid under 
ASPA.  The two separate tables are useful as comparisons in order to examine the relative need for aid 
versus the relative commitment from the U.S. to particular African countries. Gross aid under ASPA is 
listed in the database on U.S. Military Assistance for the Congressional Budget Justification for FY05 
Foreign Operations, April 2005, African Region-ASPA AID.36  See Appendix B for military aid defined. 
See Appendix C for a breakdown of civilians trained under these programs and for the specific dollar 
amount of foreign military training accompanied by U.S. statements on the status of the BIAs regarding 
the eight countries in this study.  
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Relative Need for Aid: Countries Who Refuse to Sign a BIA 
TABLE 2    
Recipient Gross Aid 
under 
ASPA 
Population Per 
Capita 
Aid 
Per 
Capita 
GDP 
Relative 
Commitment 
Benin 250,000 7,460,025    
** 
.03 1,200 40 
Kenya 15,650,000 33,829,590  
** 
.5 1,100 509 
Lesotho 50,000 1,867,035    
** 
.03 3,200 86 
Mali 175,000 12,291,529 .01 900 13 
Namibia 100,000 2,030,692    
** 
.05 7,300 359 
Niger 100,000 11,665,937 .008 900 8 
S. Africa 1,050,000 44,344,136  
** 
.02 11,100 263 
Tanzania 100,000 36,766,356   
** 
.002 700 2 
                                           N=8 
 
 
** Note Concerning Population:  
Estimates for all these countries explicitly take into account the effects of excess mortality due to AIDS; 
this can  result in lower life expectancy, higher infant mortality and death rates, lower population and  
growth rates, and changes in the distribution of population by age and sex than would otherwise be 
expected. (July 2005 estimate.)  Source: CIA Fact Book 2005. 
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Table 3                             Relative Need for Aid     (Countries Who Have Signed BIAs)                            N=32 
Recipient   Gross Aid 
Under ASPA 
Population 
 
Per Capita Aid Per Capita GDP Relative 
Commitment 
Angola 3,300,000 11,190,786 .3 2,100 619 
Botswana 1,200,000 1,640,115       ** .7 9,200 6731 
Burkina Faso 50,000 13,925,313     ** .004 1,200 4.3 
Burundi 3,300,000 6,370,609       ** .52   600 311 
Central African Rep. 110,000 3,799,897       ** .02 1,100 31.8 
Chad 225,000 9,826,419 .02 1,600 36.7 
Comoros 50,000 671,247 .07 700 52.1 
Congo (Brazzaville) 110,000 3,039,126       ** .04 800 29 
DRC 5,050,000 60,085,804     ** .08 700 58.8 
Cote d’ Ivoire 50,000 17,298,040     ** .003 1,500 4.3 
Djibouti 6,325,000 476,703 13.3 1,300 17249.7 
Equatorial Guinea 50,000 535,881 .09 2,700 252 
Eritrea 950,000 4,561,599 .21 900 187 
Ethiopia 7,600,000 73,053,286     ** .10 800 83.2 
Gabon 210,000 1,389,201       ** .15 5,900 891.9 
Gambia 75,000 1,593,256 .05 1,800 84.8 
Ghana 1,075,000 21,029,853     ** .05 2,300 117.6 
Guinea 350,000 9,467,866 .04 2,100 77.7 
Liberia 25,000,000 3,482,211 7.18 900 6461.4 
Madagascar 200,000 18,040,341 .01 800 8.9 
Malawi 360,000 12,158,924     ** .03 600 17.8 
Mauritania 130,000 3,086,859 .04 1,800 75.8 
Mauritius 125,000 1,230,602 .10 12,800 1300.2 
Mozambique 215,000 19,406,703     ** .01 1,200 13.3 
Nigeria 6,800,000 128,771,988   ** .05 1,000 52.9 
Rwanda 225,000 8,440,820      ** .03 1,300 34.7 
Senegal 1,600,000 11,126,832 .14   1,700 244.4 
Seychelles 100,000 81,188 1.2 7,800 9607.3 
Sierra Leone 5,300,000 6,017,643 .88   600 528.4 
Togo 120,000 5,681,519      ** .02 1,600 33.8 
Uganda 225,000 27,269,482    ** .008 1,500 12.4 
Zambia 225,000 11,261,795    ** .02 900 18              
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     The country studies show that the U.S. is involved to some degree in all eight countries and that aid is 
a useful resource, it is not something that the countries do not need. The most important factor concerning 
U.S. interests in these eight countries is that the majority of aid withheld would go towards counter-
terrorism efforts (See Appendix C). Military aid to these countries has increased over the years, not 
decreased.  Therefore ASPA and ESF aid is needed in order for African countries to reinforce and support 
the counter-terrorism efforts of the U.S.  
     The tables are very illustrative of the need for aid versus the relative commitment on the part of the 
U.S. toward certain countries. However, an analysis of these tables show a definitive trend towards the 
relative need for aid more in Table 3 (countries that have signed a BIA) than in Table 2 (countries that 
refuse to sign a BIA). Table 2 is significant in that per capita aid to Namibia, Niger and Tanzania results 
in a coefficient of .002, .005 and .05 respectively.  This leads me to believe that perhaps, for the eight 
countries in Table 2, aid may not be that significant of a factor for them to sign a BIA. The paltry sums of 
aid to Tanzania are staggering considering the total of its population, aids problems and the ICTR. The 
lower commitment numbers for the other countries, excluding Kenya (U.S. Embassy) do constitute, 
according to the formula, the relative need for aid.      
     However, there can be a relative need for aid and a refusal by a country to accept it if the aid is 
insignificant and the country has obligations that they deem more important. For example, according to 
Benson Olugbuo of the CICC, there is an understanding that “the so-called military cuts do not really 
affect much of the funding South Africa receives from the US government.”37  In addition, Thuita 
Mwangi, the Director of Political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry of Kenya reasoned, “there are other 
countries that are willing to provide resources to Kenya and money available to cushion the country 
should aid be withheld.”38   
     The U.S. BIA strategy also appears to be receiving strong criticism from a much more unlikely source. 
General Bantz Craddock, Commander of the U.S. Southern Command responsible for U.S. forces in Latin 
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America and the Caribbean delivered a statement before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee on 9 
March 2005. He stated:   
“The ASPA, in my judgment, has the unintended consequence of restricting our access to and interaction 
with many important partner nations…[it] hamper[s] is an essential element of our regional security 
cooperation strategy…and may have negative effects on long-term U.S. security interests in the Western 
Hemisphere…” The following day, at a panel for military officials and security analysts in Miami, 
Craddock declared: “China is building up its military ties with Latin America, partly as military officials 
made 20 visits to the region last year and senior Latin American military officers who used to travel to the 
U.S. for training are going to China instead…It’s a new dynamic, a new factor to be watched.” 39 
 
      Table 2 also puts the countries in Table 3 in a better perspective when measuring for the relative need 
for aid. The majority of countries in Table 3 have much lower relative commitment numbers, which 
according to the formula constitutes a higher relative need for aid.  The higher relative need for aid added 
to the high number of countries that have signed a BIA (32) increase the odds empirically that aid is a 
major factor in signing a BIA. This fact also gives credence that other factors are at play for the eight 
countries that have not signed a BIA.   
     Interestingly, both tables show the trends of absolute commitment on the part of the U.S. toward 
certain countries more than others do.  For example, in Table 2, the U.S. offered three countries aid worth 
$100,000: Namibia, Niger and Tanzania. The relative commitment numbers are very significant regarding 
Namibia in relation to the same sums of aid being offered to Niger and Tanzania. The total population of 
Tanzania is much higher than Namibia and Niger. It seems that the U.S. has more of a relative 
commitment and interest towards Namibia as seen by the score of 359.  Tanzania, on the other hand only 
gets a relative commitment score of 2 with Niger coming in at 8.  Upon examining Table 3, once again 
there is more of a relative commitment on the part of the U.S. in Djibouti, Liberia, Seychelles, Mauritius 
and Sierra Leone, which can be explained easily. Djibouti is a strategic training area for U.S. troops. This 
can be seen by the small population versus the staggering relative commitment number. Mauritius is part 
of the Pan-Sahel initiative and Liberia and Sierra Leone are still in the process of reconstruction after civil 
wars of which the U.S. has provided logistical support and programs. Thus, these relative commitment 
figures match the output of U.S. interest and energy. In its totality, the tables show that the majority of 
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countries in the African region need aid and that there are other factors more important to the eight 
countries in Table 2 than aid.   
   The need for aid overall has caused a large number of countries in the African region to acquiesce in 
signing a BIA.  There is evidence from statements proffered by country officials that the relative need for 
aid is a huge factor concerning the signing of a BIA.  For example, The Associate Executive Director of 
the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD), Dr. Baffuor Agyeman-Duah stated:  
“The U.S. government bullied the Ghana government into ratifying the BIA. According to him, the U.S. 
pushed economically, militarily and politically weak nations like Ghana into submission through the 
international politics of ‘carrots and sticks’ in order to pre-empt any possibility of its soldiers committing 
atrocities against humanity. It is for this reason; therefore, that the government ratified the agreement in 
the best interest of the nation.” 40  
  
     Faced with poverty, the president must have taken into consideration the effects that Ghana would 
experience in rejecting the agreement. Alternately, Liberia signed for economic reasons. U.S. State 
Department Spokesman Richard Boucher stated: "Liberia and the United States have signed the 
agreement as part of a worldwide Article 98 agreement push, adding that the deal would make it easier for 
Washington to support peacekeeping efforts in Liberia.” 41  The same scenario would probably apply to 
the Congo and Sierra Leone as well, for the U.S. also assists with peacekeeping initiatives in these 
countries.  In the case of Sierra Leone, upon signature of a BIA, it was announced that “the U.S. would 
invest $25 million in the Sierra Rutile Mines.” 42  
     Although Niger has resisted signing a BIA, the temptation is strong.  According to a senior Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs official, “the United States threatened to suspend cooperative development projects if 
Niger does not sign a bilateral agreement.” 43  With Niger being extremely poor, it may cave into pressure 
from the U.S. in the future.  However, the U.S. has suspended economic and military assistance to Niger 
twice: once in 1999 over a coup and again in 2003 over the uranium transfer issue.44  Perhaps Niger is 
used to having aid withheld from the U.S. only to get it reinstated later.  South Africa has also stressed the 
aid factor in its decision to not sign a BIA in that “the aid package that the U.S. is offering in return for 
signing a BIA does not fit South Africa’s requirements.  Also, South Africa is aware that two years ago 
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the U.S. cut off key elements of their military aid when South Africa would not tow the line on the U.S. 
stance concerning the ICC.” 45   
     These examples illustrate that countries are not taking the BIAs lightly and under some circumstances 
feel pressured into making decisions under the threat of aid.  Francis Dako, the Francophone Coordinator 
for the African Region to the CICC, stressed the aids incentive factor: 
“It can be said that almost all African Countries that have signed a BIA did so because of the ‘aids 
incentive’ factor. This is the obvious. The U.S. government has made it a clear policy to withhold all U.S. 
aid packages to any country that does not sign a BIA: this includes Benin, Mali and Niger. The effect of 
the U.S. policy is very damaging to the economies of these countries. Its long term effect will be that it 
will invariably delay and in some cases derail ongoing economic projects. In the event that such a 
scenario played out, I do not think that the EU would sit by and watch these countries groan under U.S. 
economic blackmail before coming in with European Development funds. Nevertheless, in the face of 
such a situation, I think the effects would be felt on economic and political fronts.” 46 
 
     Other African scholars have also stressed a similar view regarding the aids incentive factor.  
According to Godfrey Odongo of the Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape: 
“My opinion is that the fear of losing military / humanitarian U.S. aid is a key factor in the decisions of 
the majority of countries to sign a BIA. The case of South Africa where I am currrently based is a little 
different from the rest. The economy is very strong as compared to the erst of African countries and its 
GDP is almost the total of Southern African States combined. We are talking of an economy that is driven 
domestically and is not dependent at all on the World Bank and IMF, unlike Kenya or Tanzania which 
may have up to half of their budgets dependent on bilateral funding and multilateral aid. So its refusal is 
pegged very much on its ability to maintain independent economic sustenance.” 47  
 
     Sustenance is an important factor for a state to consider in its decision to sign a BIA. What can a 
country do to supplement aid that is withheld?  Alternate aid is one option and there have been a number 
of statements from Kenya concerning this. Another option is to depend upon neighboring countries; much 
like Lesotho does with South Africa. Regardless of how it is handled, it is one move which may enable a 
country to refrain from signing a BIA. 
 
Alternate Aid 
     The EU is a strong supporter of the ICC and is against the BIAs. In order to offset the aid denied to 
African countries by the U.S., it stated in its Joint Parliamentary Assembly statement of October 2003, 
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“The African-Pacific-Caribbean (ACP) countries that are suffering financially from their refusal to submit 
to pressure concerning the ICC, receive compensation through extension of their cooperation 
programs.”48  Further, in a Memorandum dated 16 October 2003, the ACP-EU Assembly stated that 
developing countries suffering financial measures should receive the support and assistance of the EU and 
other developed countries that are parties to the ICC.  The memorandum reads:  
“The sanctions on South Africa, approximately $7m and the sanctions against even poorer countries such 
as Benin and Mali are a serious threat to the rule of law and they need to be compensated in the 
framework of the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement.” 49  
 
     In an interview with David Donat Cattin, the Legal Advisor for Parliamentarians for Global Action, I 
learned that the EU Commission decided that the "alternate aid issue" in the form of compensation to 
countries that did not sign a BIA was voted to be ‘too controversial.’  However, because of the EU ‘point 
of honor’ system, the ACP-EU decided to use a softer approach in that through the European 
Development Fund, those countries that refused to sign a BIA would receive extra aid.  He also stated that 
“the ACP-EU countries who had already signed a BIA would still get aid because unlike the U.S., the EU 
does not want to punish countries that need aid.” 50   
     Francis Dako, the Francophone Coordinator for the ICC also placed an emphasis on alternate aid being 
a factor in Benin, Mali and Niger when refusing to succumb to U.S. pressure:   
“Recent developments have opened financial doors to some countries, namely the new ACP-EU Cotonou 
Agreement which is the most important multilateral treaty governing North–South cooperation. The 
European Development Fund is bigger than any other bilateral or multilateral cooperation fund and has 
encouraged Benin Mali, and Niger from succumbing to U.S. pressure. In the present dispensation 
however, the European funds serve as a consolation for the huge aids losses being suffered in the interim. 
Candidly speaking, the European Development Fund is still a long way from the National Treasuries of 
these countries.” 51  
 
     Kenya has also stressed its reluctance on signing a BIA purely out of the need for aid.  The Foreign 
Minister for Political Affairs, Thuita Mwangi reasons:  
“There are countries willing to offer resources to help Kenya in this process and there are monies 
available to cushion the country should the Americans carry through their threats to cut off military 
support…Kenya has by default shown that it can live without donor support for almost 20 years…what 
lessons can we learn from this instead of continually begging for piecemeal donations…Donors tend to 
dictate what they want and if you accept their money, then you have to do what they want.” 52 
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     Additionally, Canada is another region that is set to offset military aid to the eight countries.  In my 
research, I have found that Canada has signed a $4.5 million agreement with ECOWAS, which will 
enable it to strengthen its capacity in peace building and security initiatives. Part of the grant will also go 
into the soon-to-be launched ECOWAS Peace Fund, as well as the establishment of an ECOWAS 
Scholarship Fund. The Scholarship Fund will finance specific training programs for West African military 
and civilian personnel at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Accra, Ghana. 
The Peace Fund is expected to enable ECOWAS to finance a wide-range of activities, including 
humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention and peace building activities such as child protection and 
elections monitoring.53  One major objective of the FMF program is to “improve key capabilities of 
friendly countries to contribute to peacekeeping and humanitarian crises.”54 Militarily, ECOWAS 
provides peacekeeping contingents in Africa. Benin, Mali, Namibia and South Africa are all leaders in 
peacekeeping efforts but the freeze on aid has not affected their decision to sign the BIAs. In fact, the 
U.S. provided nearly $26 million in logistics support to enable the deployment of ECOWAS 
peacekeeping forces when they sent troops to assist Liberia in 2003.55    
     The implication to the aforementioned is that if financial aid will be offset through other initiatives, 
then countries may see no need to sign a BIA. The drawback to this theory is that it does not adequately 
explain why other countries have signed a BIA in spite of the fact that alternate aid has been offered. My 
theory here is that part of the reason could lie in the fact that the enactment of new policies often have to 
go through numerous channels and piles of red tape which take time. Perhaps, because of pressure from 
the U.S. and the time factor, some countries gave into signing a BIA rather quickly in order to keep aid 
flowing. Another theory is that the threat of withholding aid is easy to comprehend. However, some 
governments may not have comprehended the legal ramifications in signing a BIA.  Two examples might 
be the relation of the BIA to Article 98 of the Rome Statute or the issue of whether the Executive may 
sign a BIA without the knowledge of Parliament. However, this can only be speculation on my part 
without examining each individual government response and Constitutional provision. This is where 
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NGOs and the EU and Canada have proven useful in educating officials on the provisions of the Rome 
Statute and the BIAs. 
     Finally, although this is considered additional aid, not alternate aid, according to the USAID 2005 
Statutory Checklist, “countries that do not sign a BIA and are prohibited from receiving ESF under the 
Nethercutt Amendment, are still privy to Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Funding. The Countries 
included are Benin, Lesotho and Mali.” 56  This prohibition only applies to ESF, not ASPA.  Additionally, 
aid restriction does not apply to any regional organizations that may receive military assistance.57  Thus, 
countries that may receive aid from regional organizations of which they are members may have another 
incentive to fall back on in that they can still receive some type of aid. 
     This brings me to the most important question concerning the topic of aid.  What are the long-term 
effects of loss of aid for countries that do not sign a BIA?  First, it is quite simple in that a state that 
cannot qualify for a waiver from the U.S. and consequently is faced with losing these privileges may be 
driven by its concerns for national security to sign a BIA with the United States, even if it is against their 
wishes to do so. Second, politically and legally, it may create further hardship for the ICC, as more states 
will feel obligated to extend exemptions to U.S. nationals, which in the long run may result in customary 
international law. What affect will this have on the ICC and its ability to do its job effectively? Moreover, 
what type of message does this send to those who need the ICCs protection? Third, it may affect countries 
economically. Francis Dako explained the economic and political implications of the loss of aid: 
“Economically, the loss of aid would cause a series of setbacks in capital and technical projects and will 
bring a cessation to all developmental projects. Its effect will be felt throughout the economy by causing 
deficits in the national reserves and a loss of essential revenue that could lead to other hardships in these 
countries. Politically, it will cause a backlash of resentment towards U.S. government policies and U.S. 
anti-sentiment would rise. It will also cause the political opposition to use this issue as a campaign tool to 
discredit current government, which could lead to power shifts with the political setup. It will cause these 
nations to lose total respect and confidence in the U.S. Administration. In the event of such long drawn 
out policies by the U.S. Government, these countries will initiate new bilateral & multilateral cooperation 
with the EU and others that will cause the U.S. to loose its power of influence in these countries.” 58 
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     In sum, the majority of countries in Africa do need aid, some more than others.  However, aid does not 
seem to be a dominating factor for whether the eight countries in this study sign a BIA.  Thus, the need 
for other factors to be examined.  
 
7.  HYPOTHESES ANALYSIS   
Hypothesis 1:  The eight countries refuse to sign a BIA out of an alignment and / or obligation to 
Regional Organizations.   
 
 
      If the literature is correct in that regional organizations unite and form coalitions on deterring 
neighbor states from doing what is against their interests; especially if the organization in question has a 
member mandate concerning a foreign policy issue at stake, then all things being equal, it would seem to 
hold true that countries within these organizations would refuse to sign a BIA. Consistent with 
institutionalism in that states may cooperate together through internal mechanisms and bargaining, 
African countries have used regional organizations to their advantage; although it is obvious that not all 
countries within Africa have abided by regional organization mandates. Regionally, ECOWAS has 
always been highly involved and committed in the ICC ratification process by attending the early 
workshops available by ICC NGOs.59  For example, in January of 2002 in Abidjan, Cote d’ Ivoire, 
ECOWAS and the ICRC co-hosted a seminar on the ratification and implementation of the ICC Statute.  
The meeting observed that all ECOWAS member states are party to the 1949 Geneva Convention and 
their additional Protocols of 1997, and that these treaties require state parties to adopt national 
implementing measures in respect of the Geneva Convention and the repression of grave breaches of 
international humanitarian law based on universal jurisdiction.60  In addition, there is evidence to 
substantiate that external relations have played a big part towards motivating and educating African States 
and regional organizations on the workings of the ICC in general.  For example, Canada is one of the 
largest donors to ECOWAS and one of the strongest proponents of the ICC.61  Canadian Justice Officials, 
at a meeting with ECOWAS and SADC members in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire in January 2002, advised the 
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West African States on the implementation of the Rome Statute. Participants agreed that political capacity 
exists in most ECOWAS communities to work towards a smooth transitional process in implementing 
domestic legislation. All participants drafted a plan of action based on a common strategy to collaborate 
with governments to further the ICC campaign in the region.62   
     South Africa wields enormous influence in the Southern region of Africa and has been a leader of the 
"like-minded group" of more than 90 states, which seeks to form an ICC with strong and independent 
powers.63  Delegations from Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania and South Africa had participated in 
the effort to establish the ICC from as early as 1993. A number of consultative meetings were held 
between 1995 and 1997 to consider the possible implications and benefits arising from the establishment 
of the ICC.  Additionally, on September 14, 1997, legal experts from the SADC states adopted the 
‘Principles of Consensus” in Pretoria and later issued a “Common Statement” which later became the 
instruction manual for SADC’s negotiations during the Rome Conference in 1998.64  Approximately one 
year after the Rome Conference in 1998, the members of SADC assembled a workshop in Pretoria to 
develop legislation intended to address all of the members’ domestic concerns with ratifying the Rome 
Statute and to prompt its members to cooperate on advancing its causes, thereby showing the importance 
of international and regional cooperation for the future of the ICC.65   
     Furthermore, the Pretoria Statement adopted by the Delegates of the SADC States lists three elements 
of which ‘legal principles’ play a role in their decision to abide by the Rome Statute and its provisions.  
(1) the importance of safeguarding the integrity of the Rome Statute (2) affirming their desire to work 
together as SADC states and (3) acknowledging the important role played by the SADC countries in the 
adoption of the Statute.66 Additionally, during the treaty negotiations for the ICC in Rome in 1998, South 
Africa, a democratic leader in the region, along with other states from the SADC, played an essential role 
in thwarting the efforts of some major powers to weaken the court. The strong united support for the ICC 
from SADC nations, which South Africa helped to forge, was critical to the successful adoption of the 
Rome Treaty in the face of strong opposition from the U.S.67  It openly opposed the invasion of Iraq by 
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the U.S. and has been verbally dominant in its approach to the BIA issue. Alternately, Lesotho, Tanzania 
and Namibia are all SADC states, not to mention they were regarded as frontline states in the ending of 
apartheid in South Africa. Lesotho is surrounded geographically by South Africa and dependent 
economically upon it.  Additionally, its internal affairs are strongly influenced by South Africa.  South 
Africa and Namibia also have a very long historical linkage in that Namibia being formerly South West 
Africa; is also economically dependent upon South Africa.  This commonality between the three could 
reinforce the stance that their respective governments have taken on the BIA issue. According to Thuita 
Mwangi, the Political Affairs Officer in Kenya, “there was an effort to form an East African position on 
the BIAs but once Uganda signed a BIA, the issue became moot.” 68  However, Uganda is the only 
country in the East African Community (EAC) trade bloc that has signed a BIA with the U.S.69   
     The ACP-EU Assembly met in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo from March 31-April 3, 2003.  In this 
meeting, the assembly specifically addressed the incompatibility of the Rome Statute with the BIAs and 
its relationship with the ACP-EU member states: (4) recognizes that the agreements proposed by the U.S. 
are contrary to the Rome Statute and the treaty commitments of the EU member states, (8) Expects the 
EU and ACP governments and parliaments to refrain from adopting any agreement which undermines the 
effective implementation of the Rome statute; considers therefore that ratifying such an agreement is 
incompatible with membership of or our association with the EU or the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary 
Assembly. 70   
     Unfortunately, out of the number of member states in the aforementioned organizations, more have 
signed BIAs than not. Although members states may entertain the notion of a mandate concerning a 
certain foreign policy issue, as Singer mentioned; “The weaker states may feel obliged to go along with 
the definition of international self-interest supplied by the mentor power” (Singer 1972: 338).    
     In this respect, the mandates of organizations within Africa have not had an overwhelming impact on a 
majority of its members to not sign a BIA.  Also, unlike the EU which at one point entertained the idea of 
membership contingent upon not signing a BIA, members of African Organizations have not had their 
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membership contingent upon the BIA issue, thus countries may feel less hesitant about complying with 
the U.S. request.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The countries refuse to sign a BIA because they are under pressure from civil society and 
non-governmental organizations that are against signing a BIA.  
  
    If the literature on NGO’s and civil society is correct, then NGOs and civil society educate and 
mobilize public opinion thereby providing leverage in order to influence policy decisions of States. One 
senior official of a small West African country was recently surprised that the U.S. was “using 
tremendous pressure to approach his country which has never been tied to any military cooperation with 
Washington for which there is almost no possibility of troop presence.” 71  To address this issue, a number 
of ICC/ NGO groups have worked with countries in order to speed up the implementation of domestic 
legislation concerning the ICC. There have been workshops held in Tanzania, DRC, Burundi and Nigeria 
addressing legislation, draft implementation, and human rights issues.  Meetings were held in countries in 
all regions illustrating the importance placed on universal acceptance of the ICC.72   
     Respectively, the same types of effort have taken place in relation to the BIA issue. According to 
Pascal Kambale, African NGOs are aware of the importance of forming a common strategy to address 
challenges to implementation in Africa. Their actions rest on three pillars: the central role of local 
organizations; good coordination among organizations; and better access to decision-makers.73  
Furthermore, NGOs are more familiar with the decision makers and the political climate, and have a 
better sense of what strategies will be more effective in each country.74  The plan of action of the civil 
society participants at the recent ECOWAS conference in Abidjan sent a clear message to the region. 
Participants decided to make a concerted effort between and within NGOs to involve other civil society 
representatives. The success of the talks in Niger between the CICC, the Lawyers Committee on Human 
Rights (LCHR), Human Rights Watch (HRW), the media, the Niamey Faculty of Law and the twenty or 
so national NGOs is a good example of the benefits of increased consultation with civil society.75  
Regional conferences are always an excellent opportunity for such consultations. They allow the NGOs of 
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several countries of the same region to improve their respective campaign techniques by learning from 
one another. More direct and restricted meetings on a national level, however, can also be very effective 
in coordinating and raising awareness among civil society participants. This was confirmed at the meeting 
in Niger when the representatives of the entire national NGO community and of three international NGOs 
had an in-depth consultation and discussion of the ICC Statute, its mechanisms and potential challenges 
to practical application. 76 
     Tanzania has a large NGO community that has close relations with the government while Benin has a 
very strong NGO, human rights presence in their country and is a model in the region concerning the 
education of civil society regarding ICC legislation and information on the BIA issue. Francis Dako 
emphasized the importance of civil society and NGOs concerning the BIAs: In respect to Benin, Mali and 
Niger and their ability to withstand U.S pressure concerning the BIAs, one main reason can be given for 
this:  
“The present state of activeness within civil society organizations and NGOs have gone a long way by 
hampering the inability of the Governments in these Countries in acceding to the BIAs, even if the 
Governments wanted.” 77   
 
He continues regarding Mali: 
“National pride has influenced policies in most African countries in recent times. In the case of Mali for 
example, partisan pressures, and national pride in not wanting to be stigmatized as a ‘puppet government’ 
of the U.S. superpower status, irrespective of whatever economic incentives the U.S. government gives to 
boost it’s economy, is to my understanding the reason why the Malian government has refused to signed 
the BIA.” 78  
  
     In Benin: A Model for Cooperation between Government and Civil Society, Francis Dako emphasizes 
the importance of NGOs in promoting awareness of issues related to the ICC: 
 “In December of 2002, a dozen local NGOs in Benin created the Benin Coalition for the ICC. Composed 
mainly of human rights specialists and law practitioners, they developed a close collaboration with 
government experts interested in the ICC process, including officials of the Ministries of Justice and 
Foreign Affairs. As a result, NGOs have been able to engage in frank dialogues with government 
institutions. Moreover, NGOs in Benin have also successfully encouraged the government to resist 
intense pressure from the U.S. to sign a BIA.  Among other activities, a televised debate was organized to 
increase awareness of this issue among the public. NGOs in Benin also urged the government to vote no 
in favour of UN Security Council Resolution 1422 which concerned the exemption of peacekeepers from 
non-state parties to the Rome Statute from the jurisdiction of the ICC. The result has been a good 
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relationship between civil society and public institutions which serves as an example for other states in 
the region to follow.”79 
 
     According to Godfrey Odongo, South African democracy is very unique in that NGOs and civil 
society have considerable say in the matters or affairs of government.  He emphasizes:   
“Indeed, a lot of government officials/Ministers were drawn from NGO ranks. This has meant that the 
South African Government is very responsive to international influence including the influence of 
international treaties: human rights treaties included.” 80 
 
     There have been two human rights organizations within Namibia that have been instrumental in 
pressuring the government to not sign a BIA. The National Society of Human Rights (NSHR) urged 
lawmakers not to agree to U.S. requests to sign a BIA and the Legal Assistance Center (LAC) backed the 
Namibian government for rejecting a request by the U.S. to shield its soldiers from prosecution in the 
ICC.81 In Kenya, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) has been very 
instrumental in educating the public and government concerning the ICC and BIAs.  In a forum hosted by 
the commission, Political Affairs Minister Thuita Mwangi stated: 
 “Article 98 was never intended for use to enact new agreements and Kenya must be commended for 
standing up to the U.S. purely for the stakes involved in as far as Kenya’s role as a regional mediator and 
for resisting U.S. pressure when it seeks to bully those states that have chosen to stand with the ICC.” 82  
   
     In sum, there are numerous influences that may contribute to a country’s stance on the BIA issue: 
internal and external. Thus, there is not only the pressure to sign a BIA, which a government must 
consider, but also the enormous pressure not to sign. In this respect, it could be that some governments 
face a Catch-22 situation: anger the U.S. and appease civil society or vice-versa. This is very true for 
those young democracies such as Benin and Mali who face increased domestic pressure to maintain the 
status quo. This is where civil society and local NGOs are helpful in that they may assuage the concerns 
of both parties through education and support, not to mention develop stronger ties with government 
officials thus influencing decisions concerning foreign policy issues.  
  
Hypothesis 3: Based upon domestic jurisprudence, the Countries refuse to sign a BIA because they 
believe it would violate their obligations as State parties to the Rome Treaty and the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties.  
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    In Benin, no implementing legislation was needed before ratification of the Rome Treaty. In Kenya, 
Government officials are reportedly in the advanced stages of drafting the necessary implementing 
legislation. Lesotho is using Canada’s implementing legislation as a model. The National Assembly of 
Mali has completed the process of amendment to its Criminal Code to make it consistent with the Rome 
Statute. In Namibia, the government studied domestic laws as well as the Rome Statute, in order to 
determine if changes were necessary before ratification could take place. The bill on ratification of the 
Rome Statute in the National Assembly was adopted unanimously. In Niger, there was a positive attitude 
towards the Rome Statute in the National Assembly and among the leaders of the main political parties: 
legislation is in progress. In South Africa, Parliament adopted implementation legislation, which includes 
provisions on cooperation with the Court and universal jurisdiction, which came into effect in 2002.  In 
Tanzania, an implementation network was formed which prepared an analysis of the compatibility of the 
Rome Statute with relevant Tanzanian law. Following approval by the Cabinet, the Parliament of 
Tanzania ratified a protocol on the Rome Statute.83 In sum, all of the eight countries have worked 
vociferously to draft domestic legislation in order for laws to be consistent with the Rome Statute.  
      They have also covered all of the legal aspects of the BIA issue when needed with NGOs, legal 
scholars and government officials. For example, Benin has been a model when it comes to enacting 
legislation to cover the Rome Treaty.  Its model has been followed by various countries in the region. 
Benin subsequently sent the Article 98 Agreement to its Supreme Court for a legal analysis. Accordingly, 
per Benin’s Supreme Court, the violation of obligations under the Rome Statute prevent Benin from 
signing a BIA along with its obligations as a State Party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT). The issue of legality seems to be an overriding issue concerning some states decisions to sign a 
BIA. For example, according to Francis Dako:  
“Obviously, certain domestic issues, legal obligations, and alternate aides have obliged some of these 
Countries from signing the BIA. To illustrate this point, we can take the case of Benin. In this Country, 
the primacy of law for example, obliges the Head of State to seek legal opinions prior to acceding to any 
international agreement. And from the legal opinion issued by the Supreme Court, the Government of 
Benin cannot sign the bilateral agreement proposed by the American Government without compromising 
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its obligations under the Rome Statute establishing the ICC. A common stance is that Benin, Mali and 
Niger are State Parties to the Rome Statute and have common domestic legislation’s that deter them from 
signing any international agreement that will compromise their commitment to the ICC.” 84  
 
     The Supreme Court opinion stipulated that Benin cannot sign an agreement which would violate its 
obligations to the spirit and letter of the Rome Statute because: 85  
    (1) General Principles Governing the Implementation of Treaties  
     It should be recalled that the rule Pacta Sunt Servanda affirmed in the Vienna Convention of May 23, 
1969, to which Benin is also a party, rules that “ every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and 
must be performed by them in good faith”(Article 26). The corollary of this provision can be found in 
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention which provides that “A State is obliged to refrain from acts which 
would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.”86 
     (2) Specific Obligations of Benin to the Rome Statute  
     Benin ratified the Rome Statute, which imposes obligations such as cooperation with the International 
Criminal Court; the reach of such obligation would be limited by the draft agreement submitted for 
signature. Benin cannot go against the Rome Statute by basing itself on the examples of Article 98 of the 
statute. In the absence of reservations, which Article 120 formerly prescribes, any agreement which 
would come into effect following [the ratification of] the Rome Statute can only be interpreted as 
violating the good execution of its obligations.87   
     (3) Regarding the Internal Order  
     The Benin Constitution of December 11, 1990 defines the principles of defense of human values as 
indefeasible; it therefore cannot admit through bilateral agreements provisions that hamper the 
prosecution of crimes against humanity. Benin cannot sign the bilateral agreement, especially given the 
fact that it failed to emit any reservations during the ratification of the Rome Statute, pursuant to the 
provisions of Article 124 which stipulate that “a State which becomes party to the statute can declare, for 
a period of seven years from its entry into force of the statute, that it will not accept jurisdiction of the 
Court over the crimes defined in Article 8 when it is alleged that such crime was committed on its 
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territory or by one of its nationals.” Furthermore, if the motivations of Benin at the time of ratification 
have changed in light of new circumstances by virtue of the rule “Rebus sic Santibus” rule according to 
which one can invoke fundamental change of a circumstance to modify the content of its obligations, the 
Government of Benin could then foresee, prior to the signature of the said draft bilateral agreement, an 
amendment, revision or withdrawal provided for respectively in Articles 121, 123 and 127 of the Rome 
Statute. 88  
     I asked Godfrey Odongo for his view on legal obligations and the impact on countries decisions to not 
sign a BIA.  The following are his remarks:   
“A feeling of a legal obligation towards the ICC is very much discernible in South Africa. I would also 
say that if you look at a general African record, a feeling of legal obligation towards the ICC is a premise 
that one can say has shaped Africa's perception towards the ICC. This is motivated by a number of 
factors: First, Africa, more than any other continent, remains the bloody continent of wars in which 
atrocities abound. The decades old wars in South Sudan (and now Darfur), Somalia, Nothern Uganda 
(where forceful child conscription and mass atrocities, murders, rapes, pillage on civilians has been 
witnessed in high scale), the never ending wars in the DRC and Burundi, Rwanda pre and in 1994, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola (until much recently), Mozambique and many other examples, all 
point to the fact that the crimes within the ICC ambit have been witnessed in Africa, perhaps more than 
any region in the world. It is welcome that many initiatives at different levels are now in place to 
negotiate peace, forestall or prevent war etc. However, the fact is, these wars have had a big influence in 
the conscience of African governments, which have moved with remarkable speed to be party to the ICC 
by ratifying the treaty. The motivating point seems to be a desire to say “no” to crimes within the ICCs 
ambit (hence legal obligation). This desire to affirm a legal obligation may have filtered into the refusal 
by a number of African States to water down the ICCs purpose by being party to the BIAs.” 89  
 
“The South African Government is very responsive to the influence of international treaties. This extends 
to their Constitution as interpreted by an independent Constitutional Court. In effect, this means that the 
ICC rule of law framework falls into the scheme of a government or democracy, which is receptive to 
international ideas. There is in place a Judiciary, which is ready to question and in some cases veto the 
Executive/Parliament and a Parliament, which has the hallmarks of independence. These are relevant 
factors for South Africa's approach to a number of issues. The influence of international law on a number 
of issues-women's rights and domestic legislation, children's rights, restorative justice etc is very directly 
remarkable in South Africa even in court jurisprudence than say Kenya where international law's 
influence on a number of issues.” 90 
 
     Odongo goes further by explaining the significance of domestic legislation versus international law:  
 
“Another point is that for most Anglophone African Countries (with an English Common law or Roman-
Dutch law heritage in their legal system), a system of dualism applies in respect of application of 
international law-hence domesticating legislation is often needed to bring into force international treaties. 
This may even apply to Francophone African countries (with a civil law system) and a monistic system 
where a treaty is not self-incorporating-like a significant part of the ICC treaty. The record of 
domestication with regard to general UN treaties for example ICESR, Torture Convention, CEDAW etc., 
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has not been very good. However, the ICC treaty seems to be a different case. Domesticating legislation is 
in place or in the pipeline. What this tells us is that a number of African countries are taking their legal 
obligation under the ICC treaty seriously. This can further be supported by the premise that Africa had a 
prominent place in the drafting stage of the treaty (unlike in many other treaties e.g. human rights treaties 
such as the CRC that had only one African Sub-Saharan African State representing the rest). This way, 
Africa may feel as part of the ICC process as the rest of the world. Hence an active participation post 
adoption of ICC treaty as evidenced by ratification, nomination and election of judges and other officials 
and ICC meetings.” 91 
 
     Additionally, I have found that Kenya has also opposed signing a BIA in part because of legal issues.  
The Law Society of Kenya (LSK) believes that the BIA amounts to double standards. Chairman Tom 
Ojienda stated:  
“The BIA is contrary to international law and would constitute a betrayal of the Kenyan people. The BIA 
also contravenes Article 18 of the VCLT, which states that countries that have ratified a treaty are obliged 
to refrain from acts that defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.” 92  
 
     Mutula Kilonzo, a nominated Kanu MP, argued:  
“Kenya should stand firm and only react to good laws given that the U.S. has in the past two decades been 
perceived as the vanguard of human rights, rule of law and administration of justice and governance. For 
lawyers and the LSK, the key issue is that signing a BIA with the U.S. could also mean the loss of EU 
support for any lawyer from Kenya ever getting a job at the ICC as a judge or prosecutor.” 93  
 
     At a meeting for the formation of a South Africa-Kenya bi-National Commission (BNC), both 
governments rejected what they called U.S. “intimidation and diplomatic arm-twisting” on the BIA 
Issue.94   Additionally, the South African Cabinet announced its decision to not sign a BIA with the U.S. 
stating: “South Africa’s position in this regard is premised on its commitment to the humanitarian 
objectives of the ICC and the country’s international obligations.”95   
     A few African countries may have other reasons for not signing a BIA through special ties to the ICC. 
For example, the South African Government nominated Judge Navanethem Pillay, President of the ICTR, 
for election as a judge at the ICC.  Additionally, Mali nominated Judge Fatoumata Dembele Diarra, who 
served as ad litem Judge in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).96  It 
serves to reason that any country that is a State Party to the ICC and has a Judge on the ICC bench would 
not do anything to undermine the functions of the Court.  I have found out through my research that 
Ghana (who also has a Judge on the ICC bench) did not sign a BIA, but instead received a waiver from 
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the U.S. This waiver means that Ghana is exempt from ratifying a BIA and its military aid would not be 
affected.  It did however sign an executive agreement stating that it would not extradite U.S. nationals to 
the jurisdiction of the ICC.97  In addition to this, at a meeting on the ICC and Africa in 2003, The Minister 
of Foreign Affairs in Ghana, the Hon. Nana Akufo-Addo stated: 
“Despite the various conflicts that continue to bedevil the continent, the masses of people continue to 
support the rule of law. The signing of Article 98 agreements with the United States are not a reflection of 
double standards but rather a continuation of the United States policy of not supporting the Court. The 
emphasis should be to make the rule of law effective at the national level.” 98   
 
It is safe to say that although Ghana signed an executive agreement, it does not take away the concept of 
the rule of law inherent to the ICC.  
     Although I did not find any concrete evidence linking Tanzanias' not signing the BIA to the ICTR, it 
stands to reason through some common sense that it might have some effect on the governments decision 
to abide by its principles under the Rome Statute.  If anything, the ICTR has shown that the presence of 
the court raises the awareness of the importance and value of human rights and serves as a deterrent for 
people to commit war crimes. Additionally, the Government of Tanzania is frequently called upon to 
mediate between its neighbors. For example, it served a crucial political role, serving as the seat for the 
Arusha peace talks aimed at ending the ethnic bloodshed in Burundi. 99  However, I was told by a CICC 
official that “Tanzania would not sign a BIA because it finds the views by the U.S. towards the ICC 
confusing considering the U.S. supports the ICTR.” 100  Considering this statement, it is important to 
acknowledge that Rwanda is not a party to the ICC although its 1994 Genocide resulted in the tribunal. It 
is common knowledge that Rwanda has been very dissatisfied with the slow pace of trials and the 
bureaucracy involved in the ICTR and thus did not sign on as a party to the ICC.  In turn, the Rwandan 
Government signed a BIA.   
     The legal obligation that some countries in Africa feel towards the ICC is very strong and not 
surprising considering the comments put forth by various experts and officials. It is possible that although 
some countries signed a BIA because of aid, they still feel strongly towards the ICC.  This can be seen by 
the countries that currently have situations pending before the court (Sudan excluded).  It is pretty much a 
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foregone conclusion that if a country cannot handle its own legal affairs, then it will most likely refuse to 
give up aid that would benefit them.  In conclusion, it is my opinion that a legal obligation to the ICC is a 
powerful factor for whether the eight countries in this study sign a BIA. 
 
Hypothesis 4:  The countries refuse to sign a BIA because they believe the request by the U.S. to sign a 
BIA violates State sovereignty. 
 
     According to Francis Dako, sovereignty, more than foreign policy issues, is of more relevance when it 
comes to whether certain countries will sign a BIA:  
“Regarding the issue of foreign policy differences between the U.S., Benin, Mali and Niger: there have 
been no major disputes on record that would warrant such a strong anti-U.S. stance as per the BIA issue. 
On the average, the U.S. government has enjoyed good bilateral and multilateral cooperation with all 
three countries over decades. In my opinion, the government and people of Niger refuse to sign the BIA 
simply because they believe that any international agreement should serve her interest to the fullest, and 
also respect her sovereignty without bias.” 101 
 
     In Kenya, government officials said the U.S. move showed lack of respect for Kenya’s 
sovereignty.  Kenyan lawmaker Paul Muite reasoned:   
"The U.S. can keep their dollars as long as they respect our dignity. It is not only Americans who can 
train our military personnel, and it is time we started looking at the European Union, China, South Africa 
or even Japan for such training.” 102  
 
     According to the Minister of Political Affairs, Thuita Mwangi, “Kenya does have some point of 
leverage with the U.S. in that it is the site of the regional headquarters and has the largest U.S. Embassy in 
East Africa, coordinating activities in nine other countries in the region.” 103  David Musila, the chairman 
of the Liaising Committee of Parliament in Kenya also stressed dissatisfaction with the U.S. stance on the 
BIAs. Musila recalled the 1980s saga of an American soldier who killed a Kenyan woman but got off 
with a Sh500 fine and repatriation back to his country: "We should not allow Kenya to be treated like that 
again. Let Americans keep their money and we protect our country's sovereignty.” 104 
     Lesotho also cited sovereignty as an issue regarding the BIA.  According to a statement made by His 
Excellency Professor Lebohang K. Moleko: 
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 “Lesotho favors an approach that would take into consideration the concerns of those who are still 
doubtful of the ICC, with a view to accomplishing the universality of the Court. In a similar vein, Lesotho 
believes that the rights of States to sovereignty cannot be allowed to justify impunity and to compromise 
humanity’s best hope for justice.” 105  
 
     However, one problem with the sovereignty argument is that it does not explain why so many African 
countries have signed BIAs while so few have not. Therefore, Hans Morgenthau adds a different 
dimension to the argument on sovereignty in that “sovereignty is not freedom from legal restraint” 
(Barker 2000: 42).  He explains further: 
“The quantity of legal obligation by which the nation limits its freedom of action does not as such, limit 
its sovereignty. The off-heard argument that a certain treaty would impose upon a nation obligations as 
onerous as to destroy its sovereignty is, therefore, meaningless. It is not the quantity of legal restraints 
that affect sovereignty, but their quality.  A nation can take upon itself any quantity of legal restraints and 
still remain sovereign, provided those legal restraints do not affect its quality as the supreme law-giving 
and law-enforcing authority” (Barker 2000: 42). 
 
     I will admit that since so many African countries have signed BIAs, the sovereignty argument seems 
weak as countries are free to reject any type of bilateral agreement. It seems more likely that the strategy 
used to get the BIAs signed could be of importance also. It could be what some countries are referring to 
when they put forth the sovereignty argument.  In other words, its not so much what you do but how you 
do it. For example, who the U.S. government sends to represent them and the diplomatic skills needed to 
persuade a country to acquiesce to a particular foreign policy issue.  For example, Colin Powell’s powers 
of persuasion are probably different than John Bolton’s (both have been responsible for the BIA issue at 
times). Currently, Constance Newman, Head of African Affairs at USDOS, who is more familiar and 
sensitive to African politics, has entered the fray. Thus, whom the U.S. sends is an important diplomatic 
factor.    
     Of course, the other side to the sovereignty argument pertains to that argued by Kilby previously (p17) 
in that:  
“The duties of the aid donor appear to require aid conditionality that directly conflicts with respect for 
recipient state sovereignty in that it conflicts with the duty of the state to improve the welfare of its 
citizens, while at the same time preserving state sovereignty.”   
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Kilby issues a powerful argument and one that may deserve closer attention providing there are no other 
factors than aid that would influence a countries decision to forego a BIA. In this respect, a government 
may feel that their duty to provide for citizens through aid is more powerful than state sovereignty.   
     Overall, the comments by government officials citing the sovereignty issue seem valid; however, I am 
not sure if the real issue is legal sovereignty, political sovereignty or both. I realized during the course of 
this research that sovereignty means different things to different people.  No comment has been specific 
enough for me to conclude sufficiently that sovereignty is an important factor for the majority of 
countries, however, it does seem so for the eight countries in this study, particularly Kenya and Lesotho.  
 
8.     Conclusion   
     The results of this study indicate general support for my hypothesis and approach. The degree of 
cooperation with respect to signing a BIA has been charted within the constraints imposed by NGO’s and 
civil society, a legal obligation and state sovereignty and support the view that these variables remain 
important factors in the ability of the eight countries to refuse to give into signing a BIA. The findings 
also sustain an approach sensitive to the role of regional organizations and alternate aid through external 
allies. This study began following the traditional assumption that weaker states usually give into the 
stronger power because they are dependent upon them.  However, the dependency theory paradigm does 
not hold true for the eight countries in this case study as the aid factor does not seem to be an explanatory 
factor for whether these countries sign a BIA.  
        The existing literature on weak states versus strong states is applicable to this research in that weak 
states have various alternatives at their disposal in order to gain leverage to withstand pressure from a 
stronger power. The theories of institutionalism and the rational actor model are also applicable. 
Institutions are important within the African region. They create an atmosphere of cooperation whereby 
common interests are realized and whereby groups may mobilize in order to promote their agendas. This 
is evident in hypothesis two regarding NGOs and civil society, citizen involvement in ICC meetings and 
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workshops designed to facilitate the implementation of the Rome Statute, individual governments’ work 
involving domestic legislation, and educating the governments of countries on the BIA issue.  The legal 
obligations that all of the countries stress regarding the ICC is also relevant under institutionalism as 
governments have used domestic legal institutions to examine the legality of the BIA in relation to their 
obligation under the Rome Statute and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In the example of 
Benin and South Africa, this move has had an effect on their decision regarding the BIA. A legal 
obligation also falls in line with the rational actor model and is indicative of how African governments 
weigh their decisions accordingly and analyze what benefits they may obtain by the strategic decisions 
they make.  
     African countries have allied with external actors in order to further their goals concerning the ICC 
and the BIAs. The EU and Canada have embraced the ICCs jurisdiction and created spheres of influence 
within African countries thereby forcing policies in line with their own on them and vice-versa. One 
example is through the action of the EU who has created a series of mandates which support the ICC in 
the African region and is willing to assist certain African countries through extra aid in their quest to 
remain strong in the face of pressure concerning the BIA issue.        
     The stance that South Africa, Benin and Kenya have taken is of strong relevance in this authors view. 
Consistent with the rational actor model, all governments have remained strongly committed to the ICC 
through the implementation of domestic legislation and their vocal opposition to the BIA issue via 
outreach programs to all countries in Africa. Their maximum goal and payoff has been to enforce their 
obligations under the Rome Statute regardless of the pressure from the U.S. In this respect Kenya and 
Lesotho’s governments have remained vocal and strengthened their ability to keep the U.S. at arms length 
through opposition to the BIA in the name of State sovereignty.   
     Individually, the most important variable concerning these eight countries to withstand pressure from 
signing a BIA seems to be a strong belief towards a legal obligation to the ICC. Although other countries 
that have signed the BIAs may feel strongly about the ICC too, there are obviously other mitigating 
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factors such as aid, which would explain why they signed a BIA while at the same time supporting the 
ICC and its mission. The variables of Judges and the ICTR alone may present a weak argument, but when 
taking into account the statement of the government of Ghana on aid and the relevance of Rwanda’s view 
toward the ICTR, the  legal factor is strengthened concerning Tanzania, Mali and South Africa.   
     In addition, the regional organizations of ECOWAS and the SADC concerning mandates relative to 
the ICC and BIAs are powerful yet do not explain why most of the countries in these organizations signed 
a BIA. I find the argument of sovereignty a little elusive, as certain aspects of sovereignty are bound to be 
relinquished with any type of agreement between countries. In my opinion, the main issue lies within the 
coercive pressures put on a government and their ability or decision to stand up or back down on certain 
issues. However, the ability to remain firm in the face of pressure from the U.S. is strengthened by the 
support of external allies. Moreover, there has always been a debate concerning sovereignty and legal 
issues, which may be useful for another study.      
     This research set out to explain the contributing factors that enabled eight African countries to 
withstand pressure from the U.S. by not signing a BIA. The ability of strong states to coerce weaker states 
into certain foreign policy objectives is nothing new. However, the response of weaker states concerning 
the BIA is interesting and relevant for today’s times, not to mention overlooked in the literature. As Anda 
reasons in his study of the region of Western Africa in International Relations in Contemporary Africa, 
“little or no work has been done to estimate foreign policy behavior in Africa on a comparative basis” 
(Anda 2000: 11).  Similarly, although there is existing literature concerning the legality of the BIAs, there 
has been little attempt to analyze the behavior of a certain region in response to the BIA issue with the 
exception of Lana Wylie’s study on the Caribbean States. Thus, this study contributes to the literature and 
begins it concerning Africa’s response to the BIA issue. The interest in countries that do not sign a BIA is 
of importance as it helps to understand why and how weaker countries refuse to give into pressure from a 
stronger power. Although theories may provide explanatory power towards the understanding of state 
behavior, specific variables are more instructive when examining why and how states behave as they do. 
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The strong commitment of all of the eight countries in this study reinforce how cooperation and 
facilitation may be enhanced by taking advantage of institutional structures and mechanisms through 
regional mechanisms and external power relations.  
     Why should one bother with studies of certain regions or studies of weak state behavior? First, 
behavior in any region deserves to be studied for the sake of understanding international relations 
behavior. Second, according to Anda, “neglecting the behavior of weak states in foreign relations is 
contradictory and unjustifiable as the weakness of states should provide the basis for scholarly 
understanding of their efforts at cooperation in international fora.” 106  Third, there seems to be a general 
assumption that weak states have no voice, no influence and no power. This study reinforces that weak 
states are powerful in their own right and do have avenues available to them should they seek to use them.   
     On a more theoretical level, this study demonstrates the relevance of institutionalism and the rational 
actor model in analyzing the foreign policies of weaker states in the international system. African 
countries are more likely to obtain a greater benefit from cooperating with other institutional structures 
and allying with other regions that are cognizant of Africa’s needs. This enables the weaker state to resist 
pressure or gain leverage over the stronger state. Thus, by extending existing theory, this study is an 
addition to other works that analyze the behavior of weaker states. 
    Studies of foreign policy that are generalizable should be applicable to all types of states. However, the 
variables I analyzed may not be regionally specific. Regional organizations, NGO’s and civil society, a 
legal obligation and the issue of sovereignty are all variables that may be issues within other regions 
although some variables may be more important than others.  Godfrey Odongo summed up the problem 
of trying to generalize factors concerning the BIAs:  
“My view is that we cannot have a general explanation (s) to explain the trend in different countries.  The 
country-approaches to the BIAs remain domestic affairs. It is interesting how the approaches remain 
diverse and baffling on some occasions…each country is specific with a unique relationship with the U.S 
(these positions may be similar/converging for some countries). Hence, unique and diverse political, 
economic and social contexts would explain the different positions. Perhaps key government players in 
these countries such as Heads of States, Foreign Affair Ministers and others may have given us specific 
explanations as to how they approach U.S requests for them to sign or ratify BIAs. As it is, we can only 
speculate provided this is grounded on some justification.” 107  
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Domestic variables such as politics, social issues, elite behavior, executive and judicial issues may also 
contribute to states decisions in signing a BIA. These are issues that could be of further relevance 
concerning regional or individual country studies.   
     It is useful to look at some additional data observations concerning this study. I had difficulty in 
finding certain country data in relation to the BIAs. Therefore, one weakness to this study is that some of 
the countries that are included in the regional organizations I discuss have not publicly released 
information as to why they signed a BIA. Was it pressure over the aid that caused them to sign?  One 
cannot say positively without delving deeper into each countries domestic issues. I do suspect that after 
speaking with experts within Africa that some governments are hard-pressed to relinquish information in 
order to bypass fallouts from other governments. However, lack of data should not keep a researcher from 
dealing with a particular issue simply on the basis that data is unavailable.  
     My inquiries into the AU did not produce anything substantial concerning mandates, etc. What I did 
find was that the AU constitution deems the issue of jurisdiction a sovereign matter, thus it is hesitant to 
pressure states on the issue of a BIA Since all 53 African States are members of the AU (with the 
exception of Morocco), one recommendation would be for the “AU to play a more prominent role in 
issues such as the BIAs through harnessing a collective political role” considering its high profile 
involvement in peacekeeping, etc. 108  This issue would be relevant for future inquiry and research 
considering the huge obligations the AU is involved in currently; most notable, its peacekeeping 
initiatives in the region and its support to Sudan. Further research might also include the domestic politics 
of each individual country as a possible variable: this would involve a very large case study.  These issues 
will be useful for an expanded study of Africa and for the inclusion of other geographical regions of the 
world.     
     Another area for future research might include examining existing SOFA agreements in each 
government in Africa. In addition, examining each governmental response relative to understanding the 
    
 
53
   
   
 
legal ramifications of the BIA could be important: this would involve examining the Constitution of each 
country to see if the Executive may sign the BIA without the knowledge of Parliament. 
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Note:  See Appendix A for proposed text of BIA. 
 
 
2 Coalition for the International Criminal Court. “U.S. Bilateral Immunity or So-Called Article 98 Agreements.” 30 
September 2003.  
 
   
3 See Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. “Security Assistance Legislation and Funding 
Allocations.” This includes Argentina, Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Philippines, New Zealand, South 
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4  Jim Lobe, “U.S. Punishes 35 Countries for Signing on to the International Criminal Court.” Inter Press Service 
News Agency 2004.   
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6 Coalition for the International Criminal Court. “Status of U.S. Bilateral Agreements.” 20 June 2005. Note: North 
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7 International Criminal Court. Situation and Cases. http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.html 
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5882. to Amend the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill. 
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Appendix A 
 
Proposed Text of Article 98 Agreements with the United States 
 
July 2002 
 
 
A. Reaffirming the importance of bringing to justice those who commit genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, 
 
B. Recalling that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court done at Rome on July 17, 
1998 by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court is intended to complement and not supplant national criminal 
jurisdiction, 
 
C. Considering that the Government of the United States of America has expressed its intention 
to investigate and to prosecute where appropriate acts within the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court alleged to have been committed by its officials, employees, military personnel, or 
other nationals, 
 
D. Bearing in mind Article 98 of the Rome Statute, 
 
E. Hereby agree as follows: 
 
1. For purposes of this agreement, "persons" are current or former Government officials, 
employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party. 
 
2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the expressed consent 
of the first Party, 
(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to the International Criminal Court for any 
purpose, or 
 
(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled to 
a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to the International Criminal Court. 
 
3. When the United States extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the other 
Party to a third country, the United States will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that 
person to the International Criminal Court by the third country, absent the expressed consent of 
the Government of X. 
 
 
4. When the Government of X extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the 
United States of America to a third country, the Government of X will not agree to the surrender 
or transfer of that person to the International Criminal Court by a third country, absent the 
expressed consent of the Government of the United States. 
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5. This Agreement shall enter into force upon an exchange of notes confirming that each Party 
has completed the necessary domestic legal requirements to bring the Agreement into force. It 
will remain in force until one year after the date on which one Party notifies the other of its intent 
to terminate this Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall continue to apply with 
respect to any act occurring, or any allegation arising, before the effective date of termination. 
 
(Paragraphs have been lettered and numbered for identification purposes.) 
 
Source: July 2002, U.S. Article 98 Template: CICC:  
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissuesimpunityagreem.html 
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Appendix B 
 
Definitions of Types of Military Aid Withheld under ASPA 
 
FMF (Foreign Military Financing) 
Foreign Military Financing, the U.S. government program for financing through grants or loans the 
acquisition of U.S. military articles, services, and training, supports U.S. regional stability goals and 
enables friends and allies to improve their defense capabilities. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) are made 
available under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).  Congress appropriates FMF funds 
in the International Affairs Budget, the Department of State allocates the funds for eligible friends and 
allies; and the Department of Defense executes the program.  FMF helps countries meet their legitimate 
defense needs, promotes U.S. national security interests by strengthening coalitions with friends and 
allies, cements cooperative bilateral military relationships, and enhances interoperability with U.S. forces. 
 
IMET (International Military Education and Training) 
The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is a low cost, key funding component 
of U.S. security assistance that provides training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly 
nations.  Authority for the IMET program is found pursuant to Chapter 5, part II, Foreign Assistance Act 
(FAA) 1961. The IMET program exposes students to the U.S. professional military establishment and the 
American way of life, including amongst other things, U.S. regard for democratic values, respect for 
individual and human rights and belief in the rule of law.  Students are also exposed to U.S. military 
procedures and the manner in which our military functions under civilian control.  They may receive as 
examples of types of training:  Professional Military Education (PME) as well as technical training.  
Additionally, our EIMET program, a significant part of the overall IMET program, exposes students to 
the civilian community and its important democratic institutions. Overall objectives of the IMET program 
are to further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military 
relations. The IMET objectives are achieved through a variety of military education and training activities 
conducted by the DOD for foreign military and civilian officials.  These include formal instruction 
involving over 2,000 courses taught at approximately 150 military schools and installations; on-the-job 
training; orientation tours for key senior military and civilian officials; and Mobile Education Teams 
(MET), which takes the curriculum to the host country. 
 
EDA (Excess Defense Articles) 
Working under authorities established in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export 
Control Act, defense articles declared as excess by the Military Departments can be offered to foreign 
governments or international organizations in support of U. S. national security and foreign policy 
objectives.  Typically, EDA is transferred to support U. S. allies in their modernization efforts and to 
assist Latin American and Caribbean nations in their counter-narcotics programs.108 Excess Defense 
Articles (EDA) are defined in the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) as amended, section 644(g), as the 
quantity of defense articles (other than construction equipment, including tractors, scrapers, loaders, 
graders, bulldozers, dump trucks, generators, and compressors) owned by the United States Government, 
and not procured in anticipation of military assistance or sales requirements, or pursuant to a military 
assistance or sales order, which is in excess of the Approved Force Acquisition Objective and Approved 
Force Retention Stock of all Department of Defense Components at the time such articles are dropped 
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from inventory by the supplying agency for delivery to countries or international organizations under this 
Act.  
 
Drawdowns 
Sections 506 and 552 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) authorizes the President to direct transfers of 
on-hand Department of Defense (DOD)-stock defense articles and services (as well as articles and 
services from the inventory and resources of any agency of the USG) to foreign countries and 
international organizations in response to unforeseen military emergencies, humanitarian catastrophes, 
peacekeeping needs, or counter-narcotics requirements. DSCA is involved with the management of 
drawdowns to include coordination with the Joint Staff, Department of State, etc.; preparation and 
staffing of execute orders; monitoring of service execution; coordinating with the Comptroller to 
document expenditures against authorized ceilings; and providing formal reports to Congress on the 
articles, services, and training provided.  
 
ESF (Economic Support Fund)  
The Economic Support Fund (ESF) promotes the economic and political foreign policy interests of the 
United States by providing assistance to allies and countries in transition to democracy, supporting the 
Middle East peace negotiations, and financing economic stabilization programs, frequently in a multi-
donor context. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), with overall foreign policy 
guidance from the Department of State, implements most ESF-funded programs. 
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Appendix C 
 
Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress,  
Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005   -  
Released by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 
April 2005 
 
State Foreign Policy Objectives--Africa Region 
Updated: April 2005 
 
 
 
U.S. Statements Regarding BIAs and Breakdown of Aid for Military Programs 
 
 
Benin 
   
FY 2004    FY 2005    
Type of Activity Number of 
Students  
Trained  
Dollar  
Value  
Number of 
Projected 
Students  
Dollar  
Value  
IMET 7 $105,098 10 $315,077
Regional Centers 2 $28,471 6 $81,079 
Service Academies 1 $50,085 1 $50,085 
TOTAL 10 $183,654 17 $446,241
 
 
U.S. Statement 
 
Benin has still not signed an Article 98 agreement with the United States. We continue to urge the 
Government of Benin to do so and the government has repeated assurances that they believe an 
accommodation can be reached in the near future based on a draft non-aggression agreement provided by 
Washington. Programs such as IMET, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) and ACOTA will 
aid in increasing both the BAF's readiness and participation in international peacekeeping as well as 
buttressing democratic government and good governance. Benin's robust IMET program played a key 
role in keeping the Beninois military in the barracks, and reinstating their IMET program after signature 
of an Article 98 agreement will help signal our support for their democratization efforts.  
As of the publication date of this report, Benin, a State Party to the Rome Statute, is prohibited by § 2007 
of the American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7421 et seq.) from receiving military 
assistance.  
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Kenya 
 
FY 2004    FY 2005    
Type of Activity Number of 
Students  
Trained  
Dollar  
Value  
Number of 
Projected 
Students  
Dollar  
Value  
ALP 2 $18,881 3 $1,078 
CTFP 81 $223,660 20 $246,259 
FMF 0 $0 0 $60,000 
IMET 88 $644,891 51 $935,062 
Masc. DOD/DOS Non-SA 2 $295 0 $0 
Regional Centers 2 $28,534 9 $129,079 
TOTAL 175 $916,261 83 $1,371,478
 
As of the publication date of this report, Kenya is not a State Party to the Rome Statute; therefore, it is not 
prohibited by § 2007 of the American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7421 et seq.) 
from receiving military assistance. Note: Outdated info-Kenya Ratified ICC Treaty March 2005. 
 
   Lesotho  
 
FY 2004    FY 2005    
Type of Activity Number of 
Students  
Trained  
Dollar  
Value  
Number of 
Projected 
Students  
Dollar  
Value  
IMET 2 $16,463 3 $84,698 
Regional Centers 2 $27,744 4 $66,635 
TOTAL 4 $44,207 7 $151,333
 
As of the publication date of this report, Lesotho, a State Party to the Rome Statute, is prohibited by § 
2007 of the American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7421 et seq.) from receiving 
military assistance.  
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   Mali  
 
FY 2004    FY 2005    
Type of Activity Number of 
Students  
Trained  
Dollar  
Value  
Number of 
Projected 
Students  
Dollar  
Value  
CTFP 56 $210,563 7 $49,866 
IMET 3 $76,534 8 $372,213
Regional Centers 9 $130,450 6 $81,079 
TOTAL 68 $417,547 21 $503,158
 
As of the publication date of this report, Mali, a State Party to the Rome Statute; is prohibited by § 2007 
of the American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7421 et seq.) from receiving military 
assistance. 
 
 
 
  Namibia  
   
FY 2004    FY 2005    
Type of Activity Number of 
Students  
Trained  
Dollar  
Value  
Number of 
Projected 
Students  
Dollar  
Value  
IMET 1 $15,452 10 $356,995
Regional Centers 2 $28,511 6 $81,079 
TOTAL 3 $43,963 16 $438,074
 
Namibia, a State Party to the Rome Statute, is prohibited by § 2007 of the American Servicemembers' 
Protection Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7421 et seq.) (ASPA) from receiving military assistance, so no IMET-
funded assistance has been provided since ASPA restrictions took effect. Additionally, no FMS, MTT, 
CT Fellowships, or Theater Security Cooperation events took place in Namibia during 2004. 
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  Niger  
   
FY 2004    FY 2005    
Type of Activity Number of 
Students  
Trained  
Dollar  
Value  
Number of 
Projected 
Students  
Dollar  
Value  
CTFP 5 $19,000 0 $0 
IMET 1 $45,402 13 $617,906
Regional Centers 8 $123,541 6 $81,079 
TOTAL 14 $187,943 19 $698,985
As of the publication date of this report, Niger, a State Party to the Rome Statute, is prohibited by § 2007 
of the American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7421 et seq.) from receiving military 
assistance.  
 
   South Africa  
 
FY 2004    FY 2005    
Type of Activity Number of 
Students  
Trained  
Dollar  
Value  
Number of 
Projected 
Students  
Dollar  
Value  
CTFP 4 $27,758 0 $0 
FMF 70 $882,335 16 $48,480 
FMS 1 $7,610 0 $0 
IMET 6 $343,372 8 $124,821
Regional Centers 4 $51,758 11 $147,472
TOTAL 85 $1,312,833 35 $320,773
As of the publication date of this report, South Africa, a State Party to the Rome Statute is prohibited by § 
2007 of the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7421 et seq.) from receiving 
military assistance.  
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 Tanzania  
    
FY 2004    FY 2005    
Type of Activity Number of 
Students  
Trained  
Dollar  
Value  
Number of 
Projected 
Students  
Dollar  
Value  
CTFP 2 $47,670 1 $40,088 
IMET 2 $51,070 24 $552,165
Regional Centers 4 $55,426 9 $129,079
TOTAL 8 $154,166 34 $721,332
 
During FY 2003/2004, Tanzania sent one IMET-funded student to the U.S. Army Command and General 
Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS. Although ASPA restrictions preclude scheduling future IMET 
and FMF opportunities, the Tanzanian military has accepted three counterterrorism resident training 
courses scheduled for FY 2005. 
The fact that Tanzania ha not signed an Article 98 agreement limited their participation in U.S. military 
training opportunities in FY 2004 and will continue to do so in FY 2005. As of the publication date of this 
report, Tanzania, a State Party to the Rome Statute, is prohibited by § 2007 of the American 
Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7421 et seq.) from receiving military assistance. 
Note:  CTFP is a Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program under the Department of Defense that provides 
education and training to international partners in the war on terror. 
Note: ALP is The Aviation Leadership Program that provides Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) to a 
small number of select international students from friendly, less-developed countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
